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We review theories of race discrimination in the labor market. Taste-based models can generate wage
and unemployment duration differentials when combined with either random or directed search even
when strong prejudice is not widespread, but no existing model explains the unemployment rate differential.
Models of statistical discrimination based on differential observability of productivity across races
can explain the pattern and magnitudes of wage differentials but do not address employment and unemployment.
At their current state of development, models of statistical discrimination based on rational stereotypes
have little empirical content. It is plausible that models combining elements of the search models with
statistical discrimination could fit the data. We suggest possible avenues to be pursued and comment




270 Bay State Road









Labor market outcomes of black Americans, particularly of males, continue to be signicantly
worse than those of white Americans. In this paper, we rst outline the broad dierences
in labor market outcomes that economic theory should explain. We then review the prin-
cipal models of race discrimination in the labor market and discuss their ability to explain
the broad empirical regularities with respect to wage and employment dierentials. When
possible, we also look for additional predictions derived from these theories and ask whether
their predictions are consistent with the data.
In the past two decades, substantial progress has made in the development of theories that
can explain various aspects of racial dierentials in labor market outcomes. Although we nd
that no single existing theory is yet capable of simultaneously explaining key dierences in
both wage and employment patterns, a solid foundation has been laid in current literature
for such a task. We oer suggestions as to how combining various elements of dierent
theories might come close to this objective of explaining broad regularities in the racial wage
and employment gap.
Following a brief discussion of terminology in the next section, we rst establish the
key regularities that we believe a theory should be capable of explaining. We divide the
theoretical models into those based on tastes and those based on statistical discrimination
reecting imperfect information. Within taste-based models we briey discuss the canonical
Becker model with perfect labor markets before analyzing search models with a) random
search and b) directed search. The imperfect information models are divided into those with
a) dierential observability of productivity and b) self-conrming stereotypes. We briey
relate controversies over audit studies to our discussion of theories before concluding.
2 Terminology
It will be helpful to begin by clarifying how we use certain terms. We distinguish between
prejudice and discrimination. According to the New Oxford American Dictionary, preju-
diced means \having or showing a dislike that is based on" a \preconceived opinion that
is not based on reason or actual experience" (emphasis added). We therefore use prejudice
to refer to an attitude or taste that we typically capture as an element of the utility func-
tion. Discrimination refers to the treatment of people and entails treating equals unequally.
Proling on the basis of race or ethnicity is discrimination regardless of whether it is based
on reason, actual experience or prejudice. Similarly, a prejudiced rm may not act on its
1prejudice because the cost of doing so is too high.
We will talk about outcomes as discriminatory if some equilibrium result leave blacks
worse o (at least on average). Thus, in principle, although some employers may be preju-
diced and refuse to hire blacks, if there are sucient other jobs available, the labor market
outcomes of blacks may be unaected by the discriminatory behavior of the prejudiced rms.
In this case, we will say that the labor market is not discriminatory or that the theoretical
model does not produce discrimination.
Finally, we will not follow Brown v Board of Education in treating separate as inherently
unequal. Segregation in our terminology is distinct from discrimination, although we will
certainly discuss models in which both segregation and discrimination arise. But it is the
wage or employment dierentials that arise in such models, not the segregation per se, that
correspond to our denition of discrimination.1
3 The Empirical Regularities
The goal of this section is to summarize some of the key dierences in labor market outcomes
of blacks and whites in the United States. At this point, we do not address whether such
dierences can be explained by labor market discrimination except to ask whether they are
readily explained by characteristics other than race.
We focus almost exclusively on the dierential labor market experiences of black and
white men. This is not because we think the experiences of women are unimportant but
because dierences in the patterns of participation between black and white women make
analysis dicult. For the most part, non-participation among prime-age males is concen-
trated among low-skill workers regardless of race. As we discuss briey below, this is not
true for women. Our decision to focus the discussion of empirical regularities on men is re-
inforced by the complex interaction between the marriage and the labor markets for women.
While marriage rates are lower among both black men and women than among their white
counterparts, this gap is markedly higher among women. It is dicult to determine to what
extent dierential labor market outcomes for women reect this dierence in the marriage
market (or vice versa).
1For an extended discussion of the denition of discrimination, see Kevin Lang (2007, chapter 10).
23.1 Wage Dierentials
The literature on black-white wage dierentials is extensive, particularly for men. We do not
attempt to review it thoroughly but rather seek to bring out what we view as key elements
on which we think there is a consensus.
To start, there is a large raw wage dierential between black and white men. At least
among young men, much of this dierential can be explained by dierences in the skills
they bring to the labor market (June O'Neill, 1990). Derek Neal and William Johnson
(1996) nd that after controlling for age and performance on the Armed Forces Qualifying
Test (AFQT),2 the black-white wage dierential among young men was modest (about seven
percent) and statistically insignicant. The paper has sometimes been interpreted as showing
that the entire dierential is due to premarket factors although the paper, itself, does not
make that claim.
The Neal/Johnson result has been tempered by some additional considerations. In par-
ticular, controlling for additional predictors of wages can increase the estimated wage dif-
ferential.3 Rodgers and Spriggs (1996) and Pedro Carneiro, James Heckman, and Dimitry
Masterov (2005) nd that adjustments for years of schooling at the time the respondents
took the AFQT lead to the reemergence of a substantial wage dierential. Similarly, Kevin
Lang and Michael Manove (2011) show that controlling for nal educational attainment in-
creases the estimated dierential. This is because conditional on AFQT, blacks get more
education than whites do. This is true even if we limit the sample to those who would not
have completed school at the time they took the AFQT and if we control for their educa-
tional attainment at the time they took the test. One obvious objection to the Lang/Manove
result is that blacks, on average, attend lower quality schools. They show conceptually that
this can bias the estimated dierential up or down and nd that controlling for a broad
variety of school quality measures has no eect on the results. Other controls may also be
important. Dan Black, Natalia Kolesnikova, Seth Sanders and Lowell J. Taylor (2010) nd
that controlling for location increases the estimated gap.
Moreover, the wage dierential has increased over time for the group studied by Neal
and Johnson. Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Melvin Thomas, and Kecia Johnson (2005) nd
that, while wages measured in early adulthood show little evidence of racial inequality (in
part because there is little wage dispersion to begin with), the racial wage gap then grows
2The sample used by Neal and Johnson and others took the test as part of a national survey and was not
selected on the basis of interest in the armed forces.
3See also William Darity and Patrick Mason (1998) and the reply by James Heckman (1998) and William
M. Rodgers III and William E. Spriggs (2002).
3across the life course, reaching 14 percent by the time these men reach forty (controlling for
AFQT and other person-specic characteristics). For a single sample, we cannot determine
directly whether the gap has been growing with age or with time although the latter seems
more likely. Yariv Fadlon (2009) replicates part of the Neal/Johnson analysis using the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1997. For 2007, when the men were twenty-two
to twenty-eight years old, he nds that, controlling for AFQT, the wage gap is about 12
percent. Dierences between the measures and issues with the AFQT data from the 1997
survey, however, force us to be careful in making this comparison.4
While for some purposes it is useful to summarize wage dierentials between blacks and
whites using a single number, doing so obscures important dierences even when we limit
the analysis to men. The original Neal/Johnson paper provided suggestive evidence that
the black-white wage gap decreases with skill level and that wages converge at high levels of
education for those with similar AFQTs. Lang and Manove also nd that black and white
men with high levels of education and high AFQT have similar earnings. Black et al (2006)
examine a sample of college educated men and nd no race dierence in wages once they
control for other factors. Similarly, David Bjerk (2007) nds that the entire black-white
wage dierential in the white-collar sector can be explained by observable measures of skill,
but that a signicant unexplained dierential remains in blue-collar jobs. In addition, Lang
and Manove nd convergence for very low levels of education and AFQT, an interaction not
permitted by Neal and Johnson. However, it is likely that the dierential among low-skill
workers is understated because such comparisons are conditioned on observing a wage, and
low-skill black men are more likely to be unemployed or in prison (Amitabh Chandra, 2000).
Thus, while one challenge is to explain earnings dierentials between black and white
men, there is an even greater challenge, which is to explain the simultaneous existence of
wage dierentials among relatively low-skill male workers and their possible absence among
high-skill male workers.
We know considerably less about wage dierentials between black and white women. Raw
wage dierentials between black and white women have historically been considerably lower
than between black and white men (Lang, 2007, p 284) and have at times been reversed
so that mean earnings of black women were higher than those of white women. However,
as Neal (2004) demonstrates, this surprising nding reects, at least partially, the dieren-
tial selection of black and white women into the labor force. White women with wages are
noticeably less positively selected than are black women, which results in a signicant un-
4For a fuller discussion see Joseph Altonji, Prashant Bharadwaj and Fabian Lange (2008).
4derestimate of the black-white wage gap among women. His estimates suggest that the wage
gap is only somewhat smaller among women than among men and that the gap probably
declines with education among women as it does among men.
While our focus is on labor market discrimination, the importance of dierences in the
skills blacks and whites bring to the labor market requires some comment.5 Almost all of the
models we will discuss assume that in the absence of labor market discrimination, blacks and
whites would be equally skilled. Glenn Loury and Kenneth Arrow, among others, have noted
the shortcomings of current state of discrimination theories and called for more realistic and
nuanced analysis that takes into account factors \beyond market interactions" (Loury, 1998)
and those that are \unmediated by prices and markets" (Arrow, 1998).
By adolescence, on tests of cognitive ability, the dierential between blacks and whites is
typically reported as being on the order of one standard deviation although this is somewhat
sensitive to the choice of test and scaling. There has been a fairly clear decline in this
dierential in recent years so that in 2002 it probably stood at around .8 standard deviations.
Nevertheless, at current rates of convergence, it will take sixty years to eliminate the gap.6
While we cannot rule out the possibility that both the level and the trend in the dierential
reect dierences in the expectations blacks and whites have about the value of cognitive
skills, we nd it unlikely that none of the dierence is explained by other factors.
While housing segregation has declined over the last thirty years, it remains high (Dou-
glas Massey and Nancy Denton, 1993; Edward Glaeser and Jacob Vigdor, 2001) with the
consequence that blacks live in poorer and more black areas than whites do. Such segregation
may lead to social isolation and formation of negative social identities associated with lower
educational outcomes and a variety of negative behaviors that can adversely aect labor
market outcomes (Jomills Braddock, 1980; Braddock and James McPartland, 1987; Harry
Holzer, 1987). The strand of research examining the relation between the pressure not to
\act white" (David Austen-Smith and Roland Fryer 2005, Fryer and Paul Torelli 20107) and
lower achievement of black students has further emphasized the importance of social identity,
status, and conformity in determining individual's educational attainment and other critical
choices that can determine labor market outcomes (George Akerlof 1997).8
5We thank our referees for emphasizing this point.
6The evidence on levels and convergence comes from William Dickens and James Flinn (2006).
7Fryer and Torelli, however, nd that the \acting white" eect is actually more pronounced in schools
with greater interracial contact.
8One potentially important area we do not explore is the possible relation between housing segregation
and the labor market, either through spacial mismatch or social interactions. While it is notoriously dicult
to establish causality in models of social interaction, residential segregation may impact job matching,
5Moreover, blacks, on average, attend lower quality schools, live in neighborhoods where
the average level of cognitive skills is lower and are born to parents who suered similar, if
not greater, disadvantages. William Dickens and James Flynn (2001) show how small dier-
ences in environmental conditions can be greatly magnied by dierential association. In a
theoretical framework, Audra Bowles, Glenn Loury, and Rajiv Sethi (2010) show that social
segregation is critical in generating and sustaining dierences in large economic outcomes
across generations. In their model, each individual's investment costs depend both on an
individual's ability and on the level of human capital in one's social network, with the higher
costs associated with higher individual and group ability. In this setup, small inequalities
between groups at the start can be amplied by the investment decisions of group members,
with the initially disadvantaged group investing in human capital at lower rates than the
advantaged group. Thus while many models are designed to explain discrimination in set-
tings with minimal or no average dierences between blacks and whites, it is not obvious to
us that such models should be preferred to ones in which the existence of mean dierences
contributes to the dierential treatment of blacks and whites.
Time Trends
Figure 3.1 shows the smoothed9 ratio of black to white median annual earnings among all
men age 20 and over and those working year-round/full-time, dened by the Census as those
working at least 35 hours per week and at least 50 weeks per year. Although the magnitudes
dier, the broad patterns are similar for the two series: the relative earnings of black men
rose sharply from the late 1960s until the mid-to-late 1970s and then fell somewhat until the
mid 1980s, after which they rose again until roughly 2000, since which they have remained
at.
employment, and wage outcomes by limiting the quantity and quality of personal networks that can assist in
job searches. Bruce Weinberg, Patricia Reagan, and Jerey Yankow (2004) nd that living in a disadvantaged
neighborhood reduces hours worked, with the greatest impact found in the worst neighborhoods and among
less educated workers. Patrick Bayer, Stephen Ross, and Giorgio Topa (2008) nd that greater availability
of (potential) labor market referrals at the neighborhood block level is associated with signicant increase
in labor force participation, hours, and earnings. But note that if people segregate by race even within
neighborhoods, blacks who live in primarily white neighborhoods may also be disadvantaged (Kerwin Charles
and Patrick Kline, 2006).
9Using the Stata lowess command with a bandwidth of .15. Data are derived from the Annual Demo-
graphic Supplement (March Current Population Survey) and can be found at United States Census Bureau,
Historical Income Statistics, Table P41 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/
historical/people/index.html
6Figure 1: Ratio of Median Earnings: Black Men/White Men, 1967-2009
These patterns should not be ascribed solely to changes in labor market discrimination.
Much of the improvement in the early period is undoubtedly due to the declining labor force
participation of black men (Charles Brown, 1984; Chandra, 2000; Chinhui Juhn, 2003).
In addition, early improvements can also be credited to both the rise in the relative level
of educational attainment (Smith and Welch, 1989) and the relative quality of the schools
attended by blacks (David Card and Alan Krueger, 1992). Nevertheless, it is dicult to
come up with plausible estimates of the eects of human capital that would fully explain the
wage convergence in the 1960s and early 1970s. On the other hand, they make the absence
of further convergence in the late 1970s and much of the 1980s even more surprising.
The very large gains made by black men after the mid-to-late 1980s cannot be accounted
for by nonearners in the Current Population Survey since there was little change during this
period.While the the proportion of black men age 22-64 who were in prison or jail (and thus
not in the CPS sample) grew (Bruce Western 2006, table 1.1; Bruce Western and Becky
Petit, 2005), the increase in incarceration rates cannot explain the large convergence from a
black-white earnings ratio of .62 in 1987 to .77 in 2000. Moreover, Neal (2006) shows that
skill convergence between young black and white men stopped and may even have reversed
itself among those born after 1960. Thus overall skill convergence should have slowed after
1990, making it dicult to explain why earnings convergence reasserted itself.
73.2 Employment Dierentials
Much less attention has been paid to racial employment and unemployment dierentials
than to wage dierentials although the former are in many ways more dramatic. In 2008,
the labor force participation rate of black men age 25-54 was 83.7% compared with 91.5%
among white men. The unemployment rate was 9.1% compared with 4.5%. These two
dierences combined imply that white men in this age group are fteen percent more likely
to be employed than are black men. It should be recalled that these gures refer to the
civilian non-institutionalized labor force. While adding the military would somewhat reduce
the racial discrepancy, including the incarcerated population would worsen it noticeably
(Chandra, 2000; Western and Pettit, 2005).
Leslie Stratton (1993) nds that very little of the unemployment dierential can be ac-
counted for by education or other characteristics captured in the Census. More strikingly,
in contrast with Neal and Johnson's results for wages, Johnson and Neal (1998) nd a large
unexplained annual earnings dierential between black and white men even after controlling
for AFQT. Holding age and AFQT constant, black men earn about 27% less than white
men, and, since the wage dierential is small, most of this dierence in earnings reects a
disparity in hours worked. Like the wage dierential, the employment dierential declines
with education. Johnson and Neal report that black male high school dropouts work only
80% of their white counterparts' work weeks, while weeks worked among male college grad-
uates are essentially independent of race. When they estimate separate earnings equations
for blacks and whites, their standard errors are somewhat large, but the point estimates sug-
gest the existence of an earnings dierential at almost all levels of education and AFQT.10
Joseph Ritter and Lowell Taylor (2010) examine unemployment and nonemployment using
additional waves of the NLSY. They nd that controls, including AFQT, can explain at most
about one half of the unemployment and nonemployment dierentials.
Part of the employment dierential is due to dierences in nonparticipation. As already
noted, black men are more likely than are white men to be incarcerated and more likely to
be out of the labor force even when not incarcerated. However, blacks also experience longer
unemployment durations. From 2003 and 2008, the ratio of mean incomplete unemployment
duration of black men sixteen and older relative to white men sixteen and older ranged
from 1.28 to 1.33. While projecting from incomplete to completed unemployment durations
10Black and white high school graduates with AFQT two standard deviations above the mean have the
same earnings. Because the point estimates actually suggest higher earnings for black high school graduates
than for black college graduates, there is no realistic level of AFQT at which the earnings of black and white
college graduates are equal.
8requires some strong stationarity assumptions, given the consistency of this ratio, it is rea-
sonable to estimate that the unemployment duration of black men is roughly thirty percent
longer than that of white men. This is consistent with the dierence that Audra J. Bowlus
and Zvi Eckstein (2002) calculate for high school graduates in the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth 1979. Similarly, Stefano DellaVigna and Daniele Paserman (2005) estimate
that the exit rate from unemployment is about 20% lower for blacks than for whites even
controlling for AFQT.
Casey Dawkins, Qing Shen and Thomas Sanchez (2005) nd, in a sample of job losers,
that with no controls black workers are unemployed for approximately twenty percent longer
than white workers. Controlling for worker and household characteristics has only a very
modest eect on this dierential. However, controls for job accessibility and residential
location reduce it to seven percent and render it statistically insignicant. We note that
these results need to be treated with some caution. As Kim Clark and Lawrence Summers
(1979) emphasize, there is considerable movement between unemployment and out of the
labor force, and it is likely that some spells of unemployment that are interrupted by a period
of nonparticipation should be viewed conceptually as continuous unemployment.11
Regardless of whether locational factors account for most of the unemployment duration
dierential, it is important to note that unemployment duration does not explain most of
the unemployment rate dierential. Some fraction of this dierence may be accounted for
by movements in and out of nonemployment, but there is clearly an important dierence in
rates of entry into unemployment from employment.
As an approximation, if workers live forever and do not move in and out of the labor
force, then in steady-state the unemployment rate is given by
u =
du
du + de (1)
where d is the duration of a spell of unemployment (u) or employment (e). In practice, this
formula will be a little o because new entrants typically begin their labor market experience
with a spell of unemployment. Nevertheless, it is approximately correct. If we set du
b = 1:4
du
w; then ub=uw cannot exceed 1.4 unless average employment duration also diers between
blacks and whites. Yet the unemployment rate ratio of black men relative to white men
is typically around two. A little algebra establishes that therefore the mean employment
duration of black men must be strictly less than 70% of the mean of white men based on
11This is separate from the issue of whether recorded labor force status has predictive power for reemploy-
ment, which it clearly does (Christopher Flinn and James Heckman, 1983).
9Figure 2: Adjusted Employment/Population and Unemployment Gap: Black v White Men,
1968-2008
the unemployment rates in 2008.
Time Trends
Using annual data from 1968 through 2008,12 we nd that the relative unemployment
rate of black and white men is well approximated by a constant ratio. If we regress the
unemployment rate of black men on a quadratic in the unemployment rate of white men,
the squared term is small and statistically insignicant. Using only the linear term, the
constant term is also insignicant, and the coecient on the white male unemployment rate
is 2.27. The solid line in gure 3.2 shows the residual from the linear regression.13
We perform a similar exercise using employment-to-population ratios. In this case we
use the residuals from a regression of the black-male employment-to-population ratio on a
12Data are for white men and black and black and other or African American men age twenty and over
and are from Table B-41 (employment-to-population ratio) and Table B-43 (unemployment rate) of the
Economic Report of the President: 2010: If we include 2009, because of the very high unemployment rate
and low employment-to-population ratio, it has an undue inuence on the regressions. We have therefore
excluded it.
13The equation is black unemployment rate =  :19 + 2:27  white unemployment rate. The coecient
standard errors are :49 and :11, respectively.
10quadratic in the white-male ratio. The dashed line in gure 3.2 shows the result of this
exercise.14
There are at least a couple of points to be drawn from gure 3.2. First, the pattern of
improvement in the wage ratio shown in gure 3.1 is by no means mirrored in gure 3.2.
The late 1960s and early 1970s which appear to be a period of earnings convergence are
also a period when the unemployment rate of blacks was relatively low and the employment-
to-population ratio relatively high. But, between the late 1980s and 2000 when there was
strong wage convergence, the unemployment rate ratio uctuated around its mean. The
black employment-to-population ratio was somewhat higher than would be expected over
this period, but since the relative incarceration rate of blacks rose rapidly over the same
period, this may be an artifact of using the Current Population Surveys.
Perhaps most importantly, in 1982 and 2007 (admittedly a trough and a peak), the
employment-to-population ratio of white men was 73.0% and 73.5%. For black men, it was
61.4% and 65.5% and thus even adjusting for incarceration rates did not drop noticeably.
Even allowing for the increased incarceration of black men over this period and the lesser
increase among white men, there was no strong change in the employment-to-population
rate of men of either race. Yet, over the same period, there was strong wage convergence.
This suggests to us that there is real wage convergence to be explained and that it is not
just a result of changes in who is employed.
Of course, without looking more carefully at who is employed (which would vastly in-
crease the scope of this article), we cannot rule out the possibility that wage convergence
reects changes in the distribution of who is employed within each racial group. If low-skill
blacks left the labor force (in part because of increased incarceration) but low-skill whites
did not (or did so to a much lesser degree), we could get convergence in earnings. Since em-
pirically, unemployment and skill are negatively correlated, given the disappearance of large
numbers of low-skill black men from the labor force, we would have expected the relative
unemployment rate of black men to fall instead of remaining constant over the full period of
our interest. Similarly, any explanation that relied solely on convergence in human capital
would have to simultaneously explain why the earnings of black and white men converged
while their unemployment rates have not.
14The estimated equation is black emp:=pop: = 543:77   14:02  white emp:=pop: + 0:10 
(whiteemp:=pop:)
2. The coecient standard errors are 155:52, 4:07 and 0:03; respectively.
113.3 Racial Attitudes
Many intellectuals in the post-Civil Rights era have suggested a \declining signicance of
race" (William J. Wilson, 1978) in American society, pointing to a dramatic reduction in
prejudice against blacks. Figure 3.3 documents the decline in prejudice as measured by
national polls and surveys. The data show large declines since the 1950s and 60s in whites'
expression of prejudiced views on school segregation, social interaction, and blacks in politics.
While we cannot completely discount the possibility that whites are merely becoming more
cautious in expressing what are now socially unacceptable views, there is behavioral evidence
to support the change. In the late 1950s over half of whites said they would not vote for a
black president. The evidence of the 2008 election suggests that this proportion has declined
signicantly.
In 1958, 94% of Americans disapproved of marriage between a white and a black. By 2007,
this gure was 17%.15 Consistent with this attitudinal change, the frequency of black/white
marriages has increased eight-fold since 1960 albeit it from a very low level (Michael J.
Rosenfeld, 2007). Thus, the survey results suggest that strong prejudice is an increasingly
peripheral explanation for racial inequalities in the labor market.16
However, results from Implicit Association Tests (IAT) (Andrew Greenwald, Debbie
McGhee and Jordan Schwartz, 1998) suggest the presence of a more subtle or subconscious
form of discrimination. In the race IAT test, the test-taker must quickly categorize pictures
of faces appearing at the center of a computer screen as \African-American" or \European
White" and/or sort words as \Good" or \Bad" by hitting a computer key corresponding
to the correct side of the grouping.17 In the rst version of the test, the two paired cate-
gories are meant to be \incompatible" to the social stereotype (i.e. \African American" and
\Good"). In the second version, the two categories on one side are meant to be \compatible"
to the social stereotype (i.e. \European White" and \Good"). If there exists an implicit
bias against African-Americans, the IAT predicts that people will be able to categorize com-
patible pairings more quickly than incompatible pairings. On average, the results show that
this is indeed the case (Greenwald et al., 2002). While the sample of people taking the test
is not random, it is very large, and we expect that it is skewed to more educated and more
15http://www.gallup.com/poll/28417/most-americans-approve-interracial-marriages.aspx, downloaded
January 5, 2010.
16The only question that receives large numbers of prejudiced responses is on the question of whether
\blacks should not push in where they are not wanted." We include this question because it has been used
elsewhere as a measure of prejudice. However, we confess uncertainty as to what it means and whether
respondents would give substantially dierent answers if the question were about whites.
17Readers may want to take the sample test at http://implicit.harvard.edu.
12We take the evidence from the surveys and the IAT as suggesting that credible models
of discrimination based on prejudice may rely on the presence of strong prejudice among a
relatively small portion of the population and/or weak prejudice among a signicant fraction
of the population, but not on widespread strong prejudice. It does not seem likely that a
large proportion of employers, for example, are willing to forego signicant prots in order
to avoid hiring blacks. The reader should note our careful wording. We do not conclude
that the IAT convincingly establishes that there is widespread weak prejudice, only that the
evidence suggests that this assumption should not be ruled out as implausible.
3.4 Summary
In summary, we would like a theory of discrimination to explain the following regulari-
ties while relying on either strong prejudice in only a small portion of the population or
widespread mild prejudice:
1. There is a notable wage gap between blacks and whites. This gap is smaller or nonex-
istent for very high-skill workers and possibly for very low-skill workers. If we ignore
this heterogeneity, a plausible number for the (male) wage dierential after controlling
for other factors is around 10 percent.
2. There is a notable employment gap between blacks and whites that is somewhat smaller
among high-skill than among low-skill workers. Blacks have both longer unemployment
duration and a higher rate of entry into unemployment. The dierence in duration after
controlling for personal characteristics including AFQT is on the order of 25 percent.
3. The black-white earnings gap has fallen, albeit sporadically, over the last forty-ve
years but the unemployment gap has remained constant and may even have risen after
adjusting for the increased human capital of black men in the labor force.
We will see that statistical discrimination models generally do not address employment
while taste-based search models typically do not permit within-race heterogeneity and there-
fore cannot address wage dierentials at dierent skill levels. Therefore, no existing model
can fully explain these regularities. However, some come closer, and it is possible that, by
combining elements of existing models, we could explain these major regularities simulta-
neously. Finally, existing models of discrimination generally cannot explain the evolution
of wage and employment disparities over time either because they predict a constant level
of discrimination regardless of the extent of prejudice or because we would expect a steady
14decline in wage and employment disparities as discrimination declines. We focus the bulk of
our discussion on whether existing theories can explain the rst two points and oer a much
more limited evaluation of theories in explaining patterns of changes in the black and white
wage/employment gaps over time.
Finally, we note that wage and employment discrimination on the basis of race are both
illegal in the United States. Almost all of the models discussed below implicitly assume
that rms are nevertheless able to engage in such illegal practices. For the most part, we
do not address whether rms would be able to violate the law or how models would have
to be adjusted if some types of discrimination (e.g. wage) were easier to detect than others
(e.g. hiring). We have not explored how this would aect market equilibrium since it would
presumably be very model specic.
4 Taste-Based Discrimination in Perfect Labor Mar-
kets
Our discussion of taste-based models begins with the Gary S. Becker (1971) model even
though it relies on strong discriminatory tastes in assuming that employers or other economic
agents are willing to pay to avoid contact with blacks. We then move on to taste-based models
in which either agents have only very weakly prejudicial preferences or only some agents hold
strongly prejudicial preferences.
4.1 The Becker Model
In Becker's classic model, white employers, workers or consumers dislike employing, working
with, or purchasing from blacks. Although the Becker model is well known, it is worth
reviewing briey since it is the starting point for more recent papers.
Employers maximize utility which depends positively on the prot they make and nega-
tively on the number of blacks they employ:
ue = ue(;Lb) (2)
where the subscript e denotes the employer and b denotes blacks.
Black and white workers are equally productive and perfect substitutes so that
 = f(Lw + Lb)   wwLw   wbLb (3)
15and
ue = ue(f(Lw + Lb)   wwLw   wbLb;Lb): (4)












Equation (5) holds with equality whenever the rm hires whites and (6) whenever it hires
blacks. If a rm hires both blacks and whites, then




Since Arrow (1972), it is common in the literature to simplify the utility function so that
it is given by
ue = f(Lw + Lb)   wwLw
 wbLb   deLb
(8)
in which case (7) reduces to
ww   wb = de: (9)
Note that whenever the wage gap exceeds de; the employer will strictly prefer to hire
blacks and whenever it is less than de; he strictly prefers to hire whites. If, as seems reason-
able, the distribution of de has no mass points, then, assuming the labor market is otherwise
perfect, (9) implies that either there is no discriminatory wage dierential or (almost) all
rms are completely segregated. Since not all rms are completely segregated, this version
of the Becker model cannot account for wage dierentials between blacks and whites.
However, if we use the more general version of the Becker model, given by (2) and
(6), then, in general, rms will not be fully segregated. However, as noted by Becker and
emphasized by Kenneth J. Arrow (1972), employers with weaker prejudicial tastes will make
more prot and will expand. Demand for black workers will grow, and in the long run, if
there are sucient employers with no aversion to hiring blacks, the wage dierential will
fall to zero. Those employers who are averse to hiring blacks and who survive in the labor
market will hire only whites. In short, employment will be partially segregated, but there
16will be no wage discrimination.18
More generally, if some employers, workers or consumers have prejudicial tastes, the
market should organize itself so that employers with such tastes hire only white workers; the
workers they hire should include all those with prejudicial tastes, or, if there are insucient
employers with prejudicial tastes, some unprejudiced employers should nevertheless hire an
all-white workforce consisting of prejudiced workers; and these all-white rms should serve
prejudiced customers. More realistically, prejudiced customers probably do not care about
workers with whom they do not interact. So blacks will be employed disproportionately in
jobs with no direct customer contact.
If the Becker model is correct, the market should relentlessly eliminate discrimination
except where it cannot provide sucient segregation. This is most likely to occur for workers
in specialized occupations requiring customer awareness of the race of the worker, where rm
entry is limited, where the proportion of blacks in the labor force is large, and where prejudice
is widespread.
4.2 Testing the Becker Model
In addition to recognizing the historical importance of Becker's work, it is important to assess
its empirical validity. If the Becker model were satisfactory in explaining all the empirical
regularities, there would be little need to assess models based on informational dierences.
As discussed above, wage discrimination will be smaller if the market is able to segregate
blacks and white racists to a greater degree. When there are few blacks in the labor market
and many unprejudiced white employers, workers and consumers, in most cases it should be
possible to achieve something approximating full segregation. Blacks will work for unpreju-
diced employers and alongside other blacks and unprejudiced whites. Racist consumers will
patronize restaurants with white waiters, but there will be ample job opportunities for black
waiters serving non-racists. When the black population is large and white racism widespread,
such segregation will be dicult to achieve, and wage dierentials will persist.
Kerwin Charles and Jonathan Guryan (2008) attempt to test this prediction directly.
They point out that for a xed distribution of prejudice among whites, segregation should
be more dicult to achieve when the fraction of blacks in a state is higher. More notably,
since in any state, blacks are at most a modest proportion of the population, black workers
18If individuals who fail to discriminate or fail to sanction those who violate social norms become, them-
selves, the subjects of discrimination, discrimination may persist even when it would otherwise be protable
to deviate and not discriminate. And often, historically in the United States, social enforcement did not
take a subtle form but rather was eected through violence.
17will be matched with whites in the lower tail of the prejudice distribution, that is those
who are relatively unprejudiced. They use data from the General Social Survey, similar to
those in gure 1, to construct a measure of prejudice among non-whites and regress the
adjusted black/non-black wage dierential in a state on the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles
of the prejudice distribution and on the proportion black in the state. They nd that the
wage dierential is increasing in the proportion blacks and the prejudice measure at the 10th
percentile. In contrast, the median and 90th percentile of the distribution have no relation
to the dierential.
The model implies that the critical percentile of the prejudice distribution should be
increasing in the proportion black in the state. If we assume that all rms are the same size,
that black and white workers are perfectly segregated, that there is no consumer prejudice
(or at least that the market can avoid it), that the distribution of prejudice is the same
among employers as among the population as a whole and that the labor force participation
rates of black and white workers are the same, then the critical percentile of the prejudice
distribution is the proportion black in the state. As the authors understand, these are
unreasonably strong assumptions (and undoubtedly false). Nevertheless, these assumptions
justify a parsimonious specication that relies on the level of prejudice of the \marginal
employer." The parsimonious specication ts the data well although probably not quite as
well as a specication with both the 10th percentile prejudice and the proportion black.
Despite its predictive power across states, the Charles/Guryan approach is unlikely to
match the time-series. Figure 1 shows a fairly steady decline in measures of prejudice, yet
this is not matched by a steady decline in the black-white wage dierential. As Charles
and Guryan (2011) point out, their prediction is about the relation between the wage gap
and the prejudice of the marginal, not the average, employer. Since the prejudice scale is
fundamentally ordinal, it is essentially impossible to determine whether the prejudice of the
marginal employer declined at varying rates over this period. The scale chosen by Charles
and Guryan does show a steady decline of prejudice at the 10th percentile except in the
late 1980s and is thus not consistent with the time-series, but it is possible that other scales
would show a somewhat dierent pattern.
5 Taste Discrimination in Search Models
In models of discrimination based on a neoclassical framework, two related forces { segre-
gation and rm entry { render wage dierentials between blacks and whites an unstable
18phenomenon in the long-run. Subsequent models have incorporated Becker's taste-based
discrimination in a search theoretic framework to explain the persistence of wage dieren-
tials in the labor market. In our discussion, we focus on search models with employer-taste
discrimination rather than consumer (George J. Borjas and Stephen G. Bronars, 1989) and
coworker (Masaru Sasaki, 1999) discrimination. The presence of prejudiced employers can
lead to dierential impact of search frictions across race groups, providing an explanation
for the black-white dierences in equilibrium employment and unemployment.
We divide search models into two classes based on how agents meet. In the rst, rms
and job applicants meet randomly. Within this class, wages may be set by rms who make
take-it-or-leave-it oers or may be negotiated. In the second class of models, workers decide
where to apply in response to announced wages.
Before doing so, we want to recognize that prejudicial tastes are likely to be more complex
than in the models we describe. Prejudiced employers are modeled as requiring compensation
in order to employ black workers. But the owners and managers of southern manufacturing
plants that would not hire blacks were not necessarily averse to hiring black maids. And
it is not necessarily the case that prejudiced employers would only be willing to hire blacks
into low pay and low skill jobs. Recent work on identity (George A. Akerlof and Rachel
E. Kranton, 2000) may explain why, for example, a male school custodian might object to
working with a female custodian but not with a better paid female teacher.
5.1 Discrimination with Random Search
The basic intuition behind the persistence of wage and employment inequalities generated
in random search models is as follows. In search models in which workers sequentially
search for a job, the worker will accept a job or wage oer if the expected value of that
oer is greater than or equal to the expected value of an additional search. Consequently,
the equilibrium wage and employment are determined by the worker's reservation wage or
match quality, dened as the wage/match quality level that makes the worker just indierent
between accepting the oer or continuing to search. The presence of prejudiced employers in
the market generates dierential outcomes across worker groups by lowering the equilibrium
reservation wage or match quality of workers facing employer prejudice. More specically,
because some rms either refuse to hire certain groups of workers or are only willing to
hire them at a reduced wage, workers who are prejudiced against face lower probabilities of
nding a position that will dominate their current oer. Therefore, because search is costly
and time-consuming, these workers facing prejudice are willing to accept a job oer with
19a lower wage and/or match quality which provides all employers (not just the prejudiced
ones) with the incentive to oer lower wages to members of the group subject to employer
prejudice.
We begin with a simple search model of employer taste-based discrimination based on
Dan Black (1995) in which employers and workers meet randomly, workers possess some
private information about the quality of the match, and rms make take-it-or-leave-it wage
oers upon meeting the worker.
Assume that there are two types of rms. A fraction  of the rms are prejudiced and
are only willing to hire white workers. The remaining (1   ) rms are willing to hire both
whites and blacks. All workers produce P in the market and nothing in home production.
Workers do not search for a job while employed and unemployed workers search sequentially
for a job. The cost of job search each period is denoted by . Workers and rms live forever,
and there is no discounting.
When workers arrive at a potential job, they are told the wage oer (set in advance by
the rm) for their type, wi, and learn the value of parameter , which can be interpreted as
how much they like the job. The utility associated with the job is u = w + . Therefore,
workers with low realizations of  will not take the job. The distribution function of  is
denoted F(), and the associated density function f(). We impose the common restriction
that F() is strictly log-concave which implies that the inverse hazard function or Mills ratio
m()  [1   F()]=f() is strictly decreasing.
5.1.1 Worker's Strategy
We can fully describe the worker's equilibrium strategy by specifying a reservation utility
level at which the worker is just indierent between accepting the job and continuing to
search. In other words, the worker's reservation utility is exactly equal to his/her expected
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respectively, which dene the optimal reservation utility for white and for black workers.
The left-hand sides of (12) and (13) reect the expected cost of generating an additional
oer for each type of worker while the right-hand sides show the expected gains from an
oer. From here, it is easy to see that the existence of prejudiced rms ( > 0) raises the
expected cost of generating an additional oer for black workers. This, in turn, implies that
for a given wage oer, they will accept jobs with a lower level of satisfaction, have a higher
acceptance rate, and V B < V W.
5.1.2 Firm's Strategy
Now consider the rm's behavior. The assumption that the workers possess some private
information about their match quality implies that each rm is a monopsonistic competitor,
facing an upward-sloping labor supply function. Therefore, each rm chooses a wage to
maximize its prots. Since white workers do not care whether they work for a prejudiced
or unprejudiced rm, their labor supply function will be independent of rm type. Given
the constant returns to scale production function, it is therefore evident (and easy to prove)
that prejudiced and unprejudiced rms will both choose the same wage oer for whites.
Prejudiced rms refuse to hire black workers at any positive wage. However, we can
readily show that the presence of prejudiced rms increases the monopsonistic power of
unprejudiced rms toward black workers, and the wages oered by unprejudiced rms will
be lower for blacks than for whites. To see this, consider the prot-maximization problem.
Unprejudiced rms want to maximize the probability of an acceptance multiplied by the
prot conditional on acceptance or
max
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for i 2 fW;Bg.19
From (15), it is easy to see that the monopsony wage will be lower for blacks than
for whites. Intuitively, at the equilibrium wage for whites, the benet to the rm from
lowering that wage will be greater when faced with a black worker, because his probability
of acceptance will be higher due to his higher search costs. Somewhat more formally, since
m is strictly decreasing, m(V B   wW) > m(V W   wW) since V B < V W. This implies that
the left-hand side of (15) is negative at V B and wW; and the second order conditions ensure
that equality is reached by lowering the wage.
In summary, the existence of prejudiced rms bolsters the monopsonistic powers of the
unprejudiced rms with respect to black workers. Even though all workers are equally
productive, unprejudiced rms exploit this power by oering lower wages to black workers
despite having no distaste for hiring blacks.20
It is important to note that we have thus far assumed that the proportion of prejudiced
rms in the market is equal to an exogenously determined proportion . Yet given a xed cost
of operation, the protability of prejudiced rms is always lower than that of unprejudiced
rms since prejudiced rms are unwilling to hire blacks even at a lower wage. Consequently,
as in neoclassical models of taste discrimination, long-run wage inequalities cannot persist
in our current setup as long as there are enough unprejudiced potential entrants to drive out
prejudiced rms.21
5.1.3 Calibration
It is perhaps somewhat unfair to ask whether such a stylized model can t the broad empiri-
cal regularities regarding back/white wage and unemployment dierences without relying on
19The sucient conditions are guaranteed by the log-concavity of F().
20The reader will note that conditioning wage oers on race is a violation of the law in the United States.
We have not tried to revise Black's model to account for this. It appears to us that rms hiring both whites
and blacks would oer a wage between the white and black monopsony wages so that the model would
continue to generate an average wage dierential. However, the unemployment analysis would be more
complex because, given the possibility of a higher wage oer from a prejudiced rm, whites would be more
likely than blacks to turn down oers from unprejudiced rms.
21Search frictions may make social enforcement easier than in Becker's model. If rms hire more than one
worker and those that hire a black worker have more diculty hiring white workers, nondiscriminating rms
may not nd it protable to enter the market. See Akerlof (1985) for a related model.
22an unduly large proportion of prejudiced employers. Nevertheless, we undertake this exercise.






The rst condition sets the black-white wage dierential at ten percent. The second ensures
that approximately seventy percent of value-added goes to workers.
It is relatively straightforward to choose parameter values such that a 10% black-white
wage dierential arises with a modest proportion of prejudiced rms. For example, if we
want only 10% of rms to be unwilling to hire blacks, then we can set  equal to 1.23 in
which case the equilibrium wages of whites and blacks turn out to be 11.0 and 9.9.
On the other hand, it is much more dicult to explain the dierence in unemployment
durations with this type of model unless prejudice is widespread. It is somewhat easier to
make this point in continuous time. Assume that the arrival of an acceptable job oer (based
on the wage and personal satisfaction value) is a Poisson process.
Then the probability of a white worker still being unemployed at time t is exp( wt)
where w is the arrival rate of an acceptable oer and equals pw where  is the arrival rate
of oers and pw is the probability that an oer is acceptable to the white worker. We can
then write the probability of a black worker being unemployed after t as
exp( (1   )pbt) < exp( (1   )pwt) (16)
since whites are choosier about jobs than blacks are. Let tb and tw represent the mean (or
median) unemployment duration of blacks and whites, respectively. A little manipulation of
(16) establishes that
 > 1   tw=tb: (17)
Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) report that the median unemployment durations are 22.15
and 29.05 weeks for black and white high school graduates. According to (17) these gures
imply a lower bound of about one-quarter of jobs being oered by rms that are unwilling to
black worker for that job. If one uses mean or median incomplete unemployment durations
for black men and white men in 2008, the lower bounds for the proportion of prejudiced
23rms are 24% and 29%.22 It should be stressed that these estimates are lower bounds.
If the arrival rate of oers were indeed 25 percent lower for blacks than for whites, the
theory predicts that blacks should be much less picky about their jobs. So to generate these
dierences in unemployment durations, Black's model probably requires that the proportion
of jobs oered by very prejudiced employers be substantially greater than 25 to 30 percent.
Although Black's model gives us a simple, intuitive understanding of how the presence
of prejudiced employers can lead to inequalities in wages and unemployment between blacks
and whites, it requires (in all likelihood) an unrealistically high proportion of strongly prej-
udiced rms to match the broad empirical regularities in the labor market. Furthermore,
the simplifying assumptions of the model precludes us from explaining several important
black/white dierences. First, although high levels of prejudiced rms are sucient to gen-
erate the dierences in unemployment rates that we observe between black and white men,
we must also explain higher rates of separations into unemployment for black workers hired
by unprejudiced rms. This issue cannot be addressed with the Black model, since there is
no post-employment separation.
5.1.4 Estimation of Wage and Unemployment Dierences
Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) develop a closely related model that they estimate using the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. From their estimates, we can conrm our
calibration that models of this style require large numbers of highly prejudiced rms.
Like Black, they assume that rms can condition the wage oer on worker type but not
on his employment situation or current wage. However, they depart from the Black model
in important ways.
1. The distaste for hiring blacks among prejudiced employers is nite so that there is some
wage at which such rms will hire blacks. However, they assume that all prejudiced
rms share the same taste parameter.
2. Workers search while on-the-job. This generates a distribution of wage oers,23 which
substitutes for the role of match-specic utility in Black by leading workers to reject
some oers.
22http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat31.pdf (downloaded November 9, 2009).
23Although there are exceptions, models in which workers can hold two oers simultaneously generally
produce a continuum of wages with no mass points. If there were a gap between wages w1 and w0 < w1;
a rm oering w1 could lower its wage towards w0; be just as likely to have their oer accepted but make
more prot conditional on having a worker. If there were a mass of oers at w0; a rm oering w0 could
raise its wage innitessimally and increase its probability of having its oer accepted by a nite amount.
243. The productivity of black and white workers may dier.
4. Matches break up randomly at a race-specic rate.
5. The rate at which rms meet black workers depends on whether the rm is racist.
Identication of the model is complex and depends heavily on the fact that the shape
of the wage distribution depends in dierent ways on worker productivity, the arrival rate
of matches, the proportion of prejudiced rms and the degree of their prejudice. This is
somewhat of a concern since the model implies that the density of the wage distribution is
strictly increasing over the range of observed wages, a prediction that is empirically false.
Bowlus and Eckstein conclude that the productivity of blacks is only about three percent
below that of whites and that most of the wage dierential reects the presence of a large
fraction of very prejudiced rms. They estimate that over half of the rms are prejudiced
with a disutility of hiring blacks equal to about 31% of the white productivity level. To
capture the divergence in unemployment duration, the model requires prejudiced rms to
search for black workers with about 60% of the intensity with which they search for whites.
Between their low oers and search intensity, such rms employ only about 14% of the black
workers. Black workers also face an exogenous job destruction rate that is about twice the
rate faced by whites. Thus, their results conrm our earlier conclusion that this class of
models requires implausibly large proportions of highly prejudiced rms.
5.1.5 Private Information about Match Quality and Longer Unemployment Du-
ration for Blacks
Asa Ros en (1997) develops a model that can generate dierent unemployment durations
for blacks and whites in equilibrium even when no rm is prejudiced. She assumes that
workers have private information about their match-specic productivity. The unique stable
equilibrium is strongly discriminatory, with lower wages and longer unemployment spells
for blacks. The driving force behind the model is that rms make more prot by hiring
workers with greater match-specic productivity, but if blacks have greater diculty nding
jobs, then, relative to whites, they will apply for jobs to which they are not particularly
well-matched. Therefore, even unprejudiced rms will prefer to hire whites. Blacks will take
longer to form matches and will receive lower wages because, on average, they are less well
matched. Below we lay out the intuition of the model in more detail.
Assume that each rm has at most one vacancy it seeks to ll. An unemployed worker
learns about at most one vacancy and also learns her (match-specic) productivity at that
25job. Given this information, she decides whether or not to apply. The rm observes the
applicants and decides with which one to bargain. Once it has a chosen this applicant, the
others leave and continue searching. The rm learns the match-specic productivity of the
applicant, and the parties Rubinstein bargain. As a result, the worker receives a fraction 
of her output and the rm receives the rest unless the participation constraint is binding in
which case the wage just satises the participation constraint. It is evident that if there is
any bargaining cost, the worker will not apply if the bargaining outcome would just satisfy
the participation constraint. In such cases, we assume that she chooses not to apply. Some
additional restrictions are required to ensure that the rm's participation constraint is not
binding.
Given the distribution of productivities and the probability of being chosen by the em-
ployer, each worker chooses a reservation productivity above which he will apply for a job
and below which he will not. Note that this is equivalent to choosing a reservation wage
since, if chosen, the worker receives a fraction of her productivity. By the usual sequential
search arguments, for a nondegenerate wage distribution, the reservation wage, and there-
fore, the reservation productivity rises as the arrival rate of oers increases. Hence if, for
some reason, whites get oers more frequently than blacks do, whites will have a higher
reservation productivity. If whites have a higher reservation productivity than do blacks,
rms will know that their white applicants are, on average, more productive at their rm
than are black applicants and will, therefore, always choose a white applicant over a black
applicant.
Consequently, there are three equilibria { one in which whites and blacks are chosen
from the applicant pool with equal probability, one in which blacks are always chosen in
preference to whites, and one in which whites are always chosen in preference to blacks. If
any rm deviates from the rst of these equilibria by, for example, giving a slight preference to
whites, it will be in the interest of all rms to discriminate in the same direction. Therefore,
in Ros en's terms, only the strongly discriminatory equilibria are stable.
Since the expected wage conditional on being hired is just a fraction of the expected
productivity, it should be evident that if blacks choose a lower reservation productivity, they
will receive lower wages on average. In fact, if blacks earn 10% less on average than do
whites, they must be 10% less productive in their matches. Finally, as is typical in models
of sequential search, a faster (potential) arrival rate of oers does not necessarily result
in faster unemployment exit although additional restrictions, such as log-concavity, on the
distribution of match-specic productivity can ensure this.
26As in the models discussed previously, separations are exogenous. Rather than addressing
whether Ros en's model can be calibrated to t the black-white unemployment duration and
wage dierentials, we address endogenous separations and calibrate her model in the next
section.
5.1.6 Endogenous Separations
Like Black and Bowlus and Eckstein, Ros en does not really address separations into un-
employment. In this subsection, we show that a model that draws heavily on hers can
simultaneously explain lower wages, longer unemployment duration and higher turnover for
blacks.
We depart from the Ros en model in two ways. First, we assume that workers are either
good or bad at a particular job and that, rather than observing the quality of the match,
workers receive a signal that tells them the probability that the match is good. Second,
we assume that the rm and worker Nash bargain over the wage, so that, in contrast with
Ros en, outside options aect the wage. We continue to assume that each worker is matched
with at most one rm and that each rm chooses to bargain with at most one worker.
By the same logic as in Ros en's model, if all rms choose to bargain with a white whenever
they have both black and white applicants, blacks will set a lower cuto probability of being
good when deciding whether to apply to a job. This will make rms prefer to bargain with
whites. However, blacks will also have worse outside options, which will lower their wage
relative to whites. This lower wage could, in principle, make rms prefer to bargain with
blacks. Our attempts at calibration suggest that for some parameters the equilibrium with
no discrimination is stable.
One can write the model more generally, but for purposes of calibration, we will assume
that there are just two signals, (H)igh and (L)ow. Each unemployed worker is matched
with a job each period and must decide whether or not to apply. If the worker applies, he
receives expected utility Ua
U
a = c + (1   P)U+
P (pV + (1   p)U)
(18)
where c is the ow utility of unemployment, P is the probability that he is chosen from the
pool of applicants, p is his signal of the probability that he is a good match for this job, U
is the utility of unemployment before the signal is received, V is the present value of wages
27if the worker turns out to be good at this job and  is the discount factor. Note that if a
worker applies for a job that turns out to be a bad match, by assumption it is ecient for
the rm and worker to separate since the worker's productivity is very low. In this case, the
worker is hurt by not receiving the ow value of unemployment and being unable to search
for one period.
If the worker does not apply, he receives utility
U
n = c + U: (19)
Combining (18) and (19) and rearranging terms, the worker will apply when receiving







If the rst inequality is reversed, he never applies anywhere. If the second inequality is
reversed, he applies to all jobs regardless of the signal. We will be interested in equilibria
where whites apply only if they receive the H signal while blacks apply to all matches. For
simplicity, we will assume that the signals H and L arrive with equal probability so that in
the conjectured equilibrium, whites apply to half of the jobs with which they are matched
and blacks apply to all jobs.
Although P does not enter condition (20) directly, being less likely to be oered a job
makes blacks more likely to apply for one with which they are unlikely to be well-matched.
In the model, the cost of applying for a job is that if the worker is chosen, he forgoes a new
match the following period. If the worker is not chosen, applying has no cost. If a worker is
unlikely to be chosen for any job for which he applies, then the cost of applying is low. In
this case, even if the match appears to be bad, the worker will be willing to apply for a job
in the hope of being chosen and discovering that the match is actually good. In contrast,
if the worker is likely to be chosen, the cost of forgoing a new and possibly more promising
match is high.
We normalize the present value of output to equal 1 and assume that the present value
of wages is determined by Nash bargaining. Note that once the worker has been revealed to
be a good match, turnover is inecient. In this simple model, turnover occurs only because
workers and jobs sometimes turn out to be badly matched. Thus we have
V = (1 + U) (21)
28where  2 (0;1) is is the worker's bargaining power.
We assume that workers and rms are randomly matched using a balls and urns model.
We are interested in the discriminatory equilibrium in which rms always prefer to try out
a white worker if given a choice between black and white applicants. Let W and B be
the expected number of white and black applicants per rm, then a standard result in the






and the probability that an individual black applicant is chosen is
Pb = e
 W 1   e B
B
: (23)
To complete the model note that
U = c + U(1   q) + Uq(1   P)
+qP(E(pjapply)V + (1   E(pjapply))U)
(24)
where q is the probability that the signal is suciently positive that the worker applies.
Finally, for discrimination to be an equilibrium, we require that it be more protable for
rms to negotiate with a white worker if all other rms also discriminate. Thus we verify
that
H (1   Vw)  :5(H + L)(1   Vb) (25)
where the subscripts denote white and black.25
Calibration Setting the unemployment exit hazard for blacks at 80 percent of the white
hazard therefore means setting Pb = :4Pw: We set the ratio of black unemployed to white
unemployed workers equal to .3. Using (22) and (23), this implies that the ratio of white
workers to vacancies is about 2.2 and the ratio of black workers to vacancies is about .7.
Although only half of white workers apply to the vacancy with which they are match, these
values imply that rms ll ve-sixths of their vacancies each period.
24See, for example, Lang, Manove and William T. Dickens (2005). These equations can be derived either
by assuming that the ratio of white and black workers to vacancies is a random variable with a Poisson
distribution or by assuming that each worker is matched randomly and independently with one rm and
then allowing the number of workers and rms to go to innity while holding their ratio xed.
25This formulation assumes that negotiating with a worker only crowds out other applicants for one period.
If the rm hires the worker permanently, it can still seek new workers.
29We set H equal to 1 and choose  (worker bargaining power),  (the discount factor), c
(the ow value of unemployment) and L such that the white wage is .7 and the black wage
is .63 and to ensure that the requisite inequalities (whites apply only to high signal jobs,
blacks apply to both, rms prefer to hire whites) are satised. We nd that these conditions
are satised for  = :467,  = :910; c = :006 and L = :124: Note that this implies that while
all jobs taken by whites last, only 56% of those taken by blacks do so.
5.1.7 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that a very simple model with random search can generate realistic black-
white wage and unemployment duration dierentials and also an endogenously higher failure
rate of job matches for black workers. The model does not require any prejudice on the
part of employers and is thus consistent with our requirement that our explanation for
discrimination not require large proportions of highly prejudiced employers. Clearly a more
reasonable model would allow the quality of the match to be revealed over time so that one
could make predictions about the hazard of exiting employment. The model also does not
address dierences in black-white dierentials by skill level, a point to which we return at the
end of the section on search models. Perhaps, most importantly, the disparities it predicts
are too strong. We are either in one of the discriminatory equilibria or in the egalitarian
equilibrium, but there is no opportunity for the extent of labor market discrimination to
decline over time, a point to which we will also return.
5.2 Directed Search
The search models that we have presented in this section thus far have assumed that workers
and rms meet randomly. However, although this assumption can greatly simplify the model
solutions, it precludes workers and rms from optimally searching for or avoiding certain
types of employers and workers given market conditions. Heckman (1998), in particular,
has criticized empirical (audit) studies of discrimination, because they assume that workers
apply randomly for jobs and cannot avoid prejudiced employers. In Black, black workers
cannot avoid applying to prejudiced rms and prejudiced rms can do nothing to encourage
white applicants in lieu of black applicants. In Bowlus and Eckstein, prejudiced rms may be
less likely than are unprejudiced rms to randomly encounter black workers, but this is only
the reduced form of an unspecied mechanism. In Ros en, workers do not bother applying to
rms with which they are poorly matched, but they can do nothing to increase the arrival
30of application opportunities for rms with which they are well-matched. Similarly, rms can
do nothing to increase the arrival rate of matches (applications) even though vacancies are
costly.
Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005) develop a model of discrimination with directed search.
In their model, rms announce wages. Workers observe the wages and decide where to apply.
As in Ros en, rms are limited to hiring a single worker and workers search sequentially.26
The rst assumption does not appear to be essential to the equilibrium characteristics of
either model, but the latter does appear critical.
In our discussion of Black, we noted that he allows rms to oer dierent wages to whites
and blacks, and they do so in equilibrium, but this is a violation of U.S. law. In contrast,
in LMD, rms can only announce a single wage and therefore cannot condition the wage on
race. Therefore, rms will always hire the most productive worker (adjusted for any disutility
from hiring black workers). In the simplest case where all workers are equally productive,
if employers have even an innitesimal disutility from hiring blacks, they will always hire
whites in preference to blacks.
The critical dierence between LMD and Ros en is that workers can choose where to
apply. In both models, blacks would prefer to apply to jobs to which whites are unlikely
to apply, because they know they will lose out to any whites with whom they compete for
a particular job. In contrast, whites do not care about black competitors. Below, we intu-
itively describe the equilibrium strategies of the rms and white and black workers.
5.2.1 White Worker's Equilibrium Strategy
Since white applicants are not impacted by black applicants' behavior, whites randomize
their applications so that the expected wage (announced wage multiplied by probability of
getting the job) is the same everywhere they apply. Furthermore, they apply with positive
probability to a job if and only if its announced wage exceeds the common expected wage
at the jobs to which they apply. More formally, let the number of white workers be Poisson
distributed with mean Z and let
zi = p(wi)Z
26Lang, Manove, and Dickens present a static model, but this appears to us to be unimportant. The
critical assumption in both models is that workers cannot apply for two jobs simultaneously. If they could
apply to two jobs, then the fact that other rms were less likely to make an oer to a black worker would
make trying to hire blacks more attractive, and it is not clear what the resulting equilibrium would look like.
31be the expected number of applicants to a job paying wi.27 Then the probability that a





Therefore, in equilibrium we have
wi
1 e zi
zi = K wi > K;zi > 0
wi
1 e zi
zi  K wi  K;zi = 0
where K is the common equilibrium expected wage at the jobs to which white applicants
apply.
5.2.2 Black Worker's Equilibrium Strategy
Black applicants only get the job if no white worker applies, which, given the Poisson as-
sumption, occurs with probability exp( zi): Like whites, blacks randomize applications so
that their expected wage is the same everywhere they apply and less than that common
expected wage everywhere they do not apply. In other words, denoting the expected number
of black applicants by yi; we have
wie zi 1 e yi
yi = J e ziwi > J;yi > 0
wie zi 1 e yi
yi  J e ziwi  J;yi = 0
,
where J is the common equilibrium expected wage at the jobs to which black applicants
apply.
5.2.3 Firms' Equilibrium Strategy
Firms choose the wage to maximize their prots which are given by
(1   e
 zi)(v   wi) + e
 zi(1   e
 yi)(v   d   wi) (26)
where v is the productivity of whites and d is the disutility from hiring blacks (or dierence
in productivity) which is presumed to be small. For clarication, further note that (1 e zi)
27The Poisson distribution of the number of workers with mean Z is the distribution that would arise if
agents from a large population were to make independent and equally probable decisiosn to enter the job
market. It is important for the LMD model that the actual number of applicants not be observable either
to rms to workers, yet the mean Z is assumed to be common knowledge.
32is the probability that at least one white worker applies and e zi(1 e yi) is the probability
that no white worker applies and at least one black worker applies.
LMD show that whenever a wage oer attracts both blacks and whites, lowering the wage
increases the expected number of applicants. Therefore, provided that blacks are nearly as
productive as whites, it is never prot-maximizing to oer a wage that attracts both groups.
Instead, in equilibrium some rms oer high wages and attract only white applicants and
other rms oer low wages equal to the expected wage of white workers in high-wage rms,
and attract only black applicants.
5.2.4 Discussion of LMD
The strength of the LMD model is that it can generate large dierentials from mild discrim-
inatory tastes or small productivity dierences. In the static model, the black/white wage
ratio is just the probability that a white's job application will be successful. To get a more
realistic assessment of the predictive power of the model, we need to develop a dynamic
version. Our eorts in this direction suggest that we can generate a ten percent wage dif-
ferential with plausible parameters. However, we do not pursue this avenue since the model
has an obvious empirical failing: it implies shorter unemployment durations for blacks than
for whites.
To see this, note that high-wage rms attracting whites and low-wage rms attracting
blacks can only exist simultaneously in the long-run if they earn the same prots. Since the
low-wage rms make more prot per worker when they ll their vacancy, they must have a
lower probability of lling their vacancy each period, which in turn means that the expected
number of applicants is lower, and each applicant has a higher probability of obtaining
employment. Thus LMD can generate plausible wage dierentials but not unemployment
duration dierentials from weak levels of prejudice.
5.2.5 Continuum of Types
Lang and Manove (2003) show that, perhaps surprisingly, if there is a continuum of types
rather than two types, the model generates higher unemployment among low types but not
lower wages. They assume that all types are equally productive but that workers are ranked
by some continuous trait such as skin color. They show that in this case, all rms set the
same wage, workers apply randomly, and lower types have higher unemployment rates.
Intuitively, the fundamental dierence between LMD and Lang and Manove (2003) is
that, in equilibrium, LMD produces segregation while the latter does not. Since wage oers
33cannot be conditioned on worker type, wage dierences between types are not likely to arise
without segregation. Furthermore, when there is complete segregation by worker type in
equilibrium, there is no competition for employment between types. Therefore, one should
not expect less preferred types to have higher unemployment. In fact, we have shown that,
given their lower wages, less preferred types have lower unemployment in equilibrium. How-
ever, without segregation, dierent types of workers compete for the same job, and the less
preferred types suer greater unemployment.
5.2.6 Lessons from Directed Search Models
In summary, the general lesson from the Lang and Manove and LMD models is that to the
extent that rms' equilibrium strategies allow disadvantaged workers to segregate themselves
from other workers, we should expect lower types to have lower wages. To the extent that
they are unable to do so, we should expect them to have higher unemployment.
LMD present an example in which there are workers with high and low discount rates
within each racial group. They show that there are four wages in equilibrium and some
pooling of white (high discount rate) and black (low discount rate) applicants at the next
to lowest wage. In this setting, blacks with high discount rates have the fastest rate of exit
from unemployment while low discount rate blacks have the slowest rate of exit. They nd
conrmation of greater heterogeneity in exit rates among blacks in Van den Berg and van
Ours (1996).
Lang and Manove present an example with three types. In the equilibrium, there are
three wages. The preferred type always applies to high wage jobs; the middle type mixes
between the high and middle wage jobs while the low type mixes between the high and
low-wage jobs. As in the example in LMD, the lowest type has both the fastest and slowest
rate of exit from unemployment. In addition, they show that there are parameter values for
which the mean exit rate is fastest for the high types and slowest for the low types.
Alternatively, it seems likely that a hybrid of directed and random search models could
produce the desired predictions. If workers do not observe all posted wages, but only a
subset, then there is some chance that a black worker will observe only jobs aimed at whites
and apply there with a low probability of employment and that a white worker will observe
only jobs aimed at blacks and apply there with a high probability of employment. However,
such a model has not been worked out.
Despite this positive assessment, it is not clear to us how robust the directed search
models are to natural changes. In these directed search models where small dierences
34are magnied, there will be strong incentives to be slightly better than everyone else. If,
for example, education increases a worker's desirability, then we would expect workers to
increase their employment opportunities by investing heavily in education. If all workers are
ex ante identical except for race, we would expect workers to choose their level of education
so that expected earnings net of education costs were the same at all levels of education.
Blacks might choose more or less education, on average, than do whites, but any earnings and
employment dierentials would be fully explained by the dierence in education. Therefore
it is not clear that such models can generate unexplained wage and employment dierentials.
Moreover, as we have noted above, the assumption that workers can only apply to a
single job at a time is restrictive. If workers can apply to more than one job, employers must
also take account of the preferences of other employers. With multiple applications, if all
other employers hire whites in preference to blacks, any particular employer may choose to
oer employment to blacks in preference to whites because their oer is more likely to be
accepted.28
5.3 Concluding Remarks on Search Models
How well can search models t the basic facts outlined in section 3? Models of random search
predict both lower wages and longer unemployment durations for blacks. Those in which
only prejudiced rms engage in employment discrimination (Black; Bowlus/Eckstein) do not
produce suciently large wage and/or unemployment duration gaps when only a relatively
small fractions of rms are prejudiced. When discrimination is an equilibrium strategy for
all rms (Ros en), it is possible to t these empirical parameters quite well. On the other
hand, when discrimination is a unique equilibrium, the model cannot explain changes in the
earnings and/or unemployment gap.
In contrast, current models of discrimination with directed search produce either wage
discrimination or longer unemployment duration but not both although it is possible to
generate both with modest adjustments. And extensions of these models might be able to
explain simultaneous reduction in the earnings gap and increases in the unemployment gap.
Perhaps more signicantly, there have been recent developments in directed search models,
and the implications of discrimination in such models have yet to be investigated. Manolis
Galenianos and Philipp Kircher (2009) allow multiple applications; Peters (undated) allows
for heterogeneity among both rms and workers. In Shouyong Shi (2009), rms oer wage-
tenure contracts and workers engage in on-the-job search. In none of these is introducing
28We note that this concern is not particular to directed search models but also applies to Ros en.
35discrimination likely to be trivial or to produce results that are simple extensions of existing
discrimination models with directed search.
Furthermore, none of the search models explains why the wage gap disappears at high
skill levels. One view is that armative action rules and more vigorous enforcement of equal
employment opportunity protect more skilled workers from employment discrimination, but
they are less eective for low skilled workers. But this fails to explain why there is still an
unemployment dierential between high-skill blacks and whites.
6 Statistical Discrimination
The second major branch of the discrimination literature focuses on the implications of
imperfect information about worker's training or productivity. Edmund S. Phelps (1972)
suggested that employers have greater diculty assessing the productivity of black work-
ers than of white workers and therefore treat individual black workers more like the black
average. In a context of de facto and de juris discrimination in education, housing, and
other areas outside the labor market, this implied that most blacks would receive low wages.
But subsequent work in this area has typically assumed that blacks and whites would be
similar in the absence of labor market discrimination. Dennis Aigner and Glen Cain (1977)
formalized Phelps using a model in which an imperfect signal of the worker's productivity is
noisier for black than for white workers, but in their model, this does not produce dierences
in the average wages of blacks and whites. Later in this section, we will describe a literature
that builds in part on the Phelps/Aigner/Cain approach to produce wage dierentials.
Arrow (1973) and Michael A. Spence (1973) developed sorting models in which employers'
beliefs about the low productivity of blacks deterred them from investing in productive signals
such as education. However, such models fell out of favor because these beliefs could be
maintained only if no blacks invested in the signal, which was empirically incorrect. Stephen
Coate and Glenn C. Loury (1993) show that such negative stereotypes can be sustained in
equilibrium by the investment decision of workers if the productive investments are only
imperfectly observed. More recent papers have developed dynamic versions of the model
examining eects on promotion.
6.1 Using Race for Inference
Both branches of the statistical discrimination literature require that the market use race to
infer information about productivity. We therefore begin with a review of a paper by List
36(2004) that, while not about the labor market, provides direct evidence that sellers use race
to infer reservation price. We then discuss Joseph G. Altonji and Charles R. Pierret (2001)
which develops and tests a model of employer learning in which employers rely, in part, on
race to infer productivity.
6.1.1 Taste or Statistical Discrimination?
While not about the labor market, an important study by John A. List (2004) takes an
experimental approach to determining whether sportscard vendors use statistical information
about race and other attributes and whether there is evidence of taste-based discrimination.
This is one of the few studies that attempt to identify the nature of discrimination rather
than its mere presence and is therefore worth discussing in detail here.
At a regional sportscard show, buyers who approached the experimenter's table inquiring
about a specic card (1989 Upper Deck Ken Griey Jr. PSA graded \9" baseball card) were
asked to participate in an experiment for a small monetary reward. These subjects were told
to purchase the card for the lowest possible price below a predened reservation value { low
and high. In a complementary experiment for sellers, experimenters approached subjects
entering the sportscard show and asked if they were intending to make a sale at the show.
If they answered yes and they possessed the Griey card, they were asked to participate
in the experiment and to sell the card at the highest possible price above a predetermined
reservation price.
List compares the initial and nal oers made and received across age and racial groups,
controlling for various subject characteristics and dealer-specic xed eects. Both buyers
and sellers made initial oers to minorities (women, nonwhites, and older agents) that were
inferior to those they made to younger white males (age 20-30). Furthermore, discrimination
was much more pronounced among sellers than among buyers. Sellers' initial oers to mi-
norities were about 30 percent higher than their oers to majority buyers. For both buyers
and sellers, bargaining reduced the disparities so that there was less discrimination in nal
than in initial oers. In fact, when buyers were experienced, nal oers to minorities and
majorities were similar. However, the minorities had to spend more bargaining time to reach
these nal oers.
List uses three complementary experiments to determine the source of the discrimina-
tion. He considers three possible explanations: distaste towards minorities, inferior bargain-
ing skills of minorities, or statistical discrimination. First, in \the dictator game" dealers
were given $5 to share with a partner whose sex, age, and race they knew. There were
37no statistically signicant dierences in the amounts transferred to minority and majority
partners except that white women receive greater transfers. This suggests that taste-based
discrimination does not explain the oer disparities.
Second, List used a \Chamberlain experiment" in which buyers and sellers bargain over
sportscards. When sellers knew that buyer reservation values had been assigned randomly,
outcomes were unrelated to minority status. Only when sellers were unsure how reservation
values were determined did a dierence emerge. This shows that the sellers' behavior is not
driven by their belief that minorities are less eective bargainers and suggests that it may
reect their beliefs about the distribution of reservation values.
Therefore, List used a second-price auction to elicit buyers' willingness to pay. Minority
reservation price distributions were much more disparate than those of the majority. To
discern whether dealers were aware of these distribution dierences, List asked dealers to
match distributions to the buyer type. Dealers generally matched these correctly, with the
experienced dealers being more informed about the disparities.
Thus List provides strong evidence that at least some agents use information about
statistical distributions when choosing their strategies for dealing with members of dierent
groups.
6.1.2 Evidence from the Labor Market
Building on Henry S. Farber and Robert Gibbons (1996) study of wage dynamics with
employer learning, Altonji and Pierret (2001) test the hypothesis that rms use race to infer
productivity. Although it does not do justice to the complexity of the analysis in the paper,
the following simple example gives the underlying intuition.
There are four types of variables that may inuence wages: race, and non-race correlates
of productivity that are observed by a) both the market and the econometrician, b) only
the market and c) only the econometrician initially but learned by the market over time.
For simplicity, we ignore variables observed by both the market and the econometrician or
only by the market and consider only race and a variable, z, that is perfectly correlated
with productivity and that is initially observed by only the econometrician. For even greater
simplicity, we suppose that there are only two periods. In period 0; rms do not observe z
and therefore pay workers on the basis of race. In period 1, rms observe z and pay workers
on that basis.
38In this case, the wage equation is
E[wi0jb;z] = 1 + 2bi + 0zi (27)
in period 0 and
E[wi1jb;z] = 0 + 0bi + 3zi (28)
in period 1 where b is a dummy variable for black. Combining the two periods yields
E[witjs;b;z] = 1 + 2bi + 0zi+
4t + 3zit + 5bit
(29)
where t is a dummy variable for period 1:
Note that, since in period 0; the market observes only race, 1 is the average productivity
of whites and 2 is the average productivity of blacks. Moreover, 4 =  1 and 5 =  2:
The important point stressed by Altonji and Pierret is that, more generally, the coecient
on the black-time (or black-experience) interaction 5 should be positive if blacks arrive in
the labor market with lower average productivity and the relative productivity of blacks and
whites does not change over time. This is because employers statistically discriminate against
blacks early in their career but as information about their true productivity is revealed, the
weight placed on race becomes smaller.
However, Altonji and Pierret nd that when they include a measure of productivity that
should not be available to the market initially but should be correlated with the information
the market learns over time (AFQT), the coecient on black times experience is actually
negative. Thus their results are inconsistent with a model in which wage dierentials reect
average productivity dierences, rms use race to infer productivity, rms learn the pro-
ductivity of whites and blacks at the same rate, and the relative productivity of blacks and
whites is constant over time.
In our discussion of the empirical regularities, we noted that, conditional on AFQT, the
wage gap between young black and white men is higher in the NLSY97 than it was in the
NLSY79. Moreover, inequality increased signicantly over the period covered by Altonji and
Pierret's data, which is likely to be reected in a larger black-white wage dierential. This
suggests that the assumption of constant relative productivity is likely to be violated.
In light of this evidence for changing black-white relative productivity, there is a second
39test implicit in Altonji/Pierret. Suppose that instead of estimating (29), we estimate
E[witjs;b;z] = 1 + 2bi+
6zi + 4t + 5bit:
(30)
In other words, we have left out the interaction between time (or experience) and produc-
tivity. Because this important term has been left out, unlike (29), (30) cannot t wages
perfectly. The coecient 6; which would be zero in the correctly specied equation will
now be between 0 and 1: If it were zero, we would t wages in period 0 perfectly. If it were 1;
we could t wages in period 1 perfectly. Since we seek to minimize squared deviations, OLS
will choose a slope between the two. This means that the wages of low productivity workers
will be underestimated in period 0 (since in the \true" wage, they are not really penalized
for their low unobservable low productivity) and the wages of low productivity workers will
be overestimated in period 1: Since blacks are on average less productive, this implies that
the estimate of 2 will be biased upwards and the estimate of 5 will be biased downwards.
Thus, if we add an interaction between the productivity measure and time to equation
(30) to get (29), we would expect our estimate of 2 to fall and of 5 to rise, which is exactly
what Altonji and Pierret nd. Thus while their results are inconsistent with a world in which
the productivity dierential (conditional on other variables) between blacks and whites is
constant with respect to experience but information on race is used eciently to estimate
productivity, it is suggestive of a model in which the productivity dierential worsens over
time but race is used as a factor in inferring productivity.
6.2 Screening Discrimination
The AP specication assumes that productivity and education aect black and white wages
in the same way. Yet models of statistical discrimination typically assume that rms have
more diculty observing the productivity of blacks or learn blacks' (or, more commonly, one
abstractly dened group's) productivity more slowly. This means that the coecients on p
and pt should dier by race. Lang and Manove (2011) argue that statistical discrimination
will also result in blacks and whites having dierent education coecients. As we will discuss
shortly, if the market has more diculty assessing the productivity of blacks than of whites,
then relative to whites, blacks will have less incentive to make unobservable investments and
more incentive to make observable investments, and both of these outcomes can be viewed
as discriminatory. Cornell and Welch (1996) introduced the term \screening discrimination"
40in a setting in which employers hire the \best applicant" and therefore tend to hire workers
from the group about which they have the best information. However, the term has come
to describe the class of models in which dierential observability of productivity leads to
discriminatory outcomes.
6.2.1 Evidence on dierential observability
Lang (1986) describes how dierences in speaking and listening patterns can generate mis-
understanding between blacks and whites. Jeerey Grogger (2008) examines the relation
between speech patterns and wage inequalities, using audio data from validation inter-
views administered to respondents from the NLSY97. Excerpting samples of speech from
these recordings, Grogger recruits listeners to answer questions about their perception of the
speaker, including his/her race. Merging these responses with wage data from the NLSY97,
he nds that black speakers whose recordings were identied as black earned about 12 percent
less than whites with comparable measured skill levels.
Recent research has focused directly on whether productivity proxies not observed di-
rectly by the market are reected more in the wages of whites than of blacks. The evidence
is somewhat mixed. When interpreting this evidence it is also important to remember that
all such tests implicitly assume that AFQT, the proxy used in all the studies, is an equally
good predictor of black and white productivity, an assumption supported by Alexandra K.
Wigdor and Bert F. Green (1991).
Peter Arcidiacono, Bayer, and Aurel Hizmo (2010) nd that any ability captured by
AFQT score is reected in the initial earnings of both black and white college graduates.
In contrast, among high school graduates, the eect of AFQT on earnings is initially very
close to zero but rises steeply with experience. However, they nd no dierence in the initial
level or speed of employer learning for blacks and whites. Looking at older workers with
considerable potential market experience, Lang and Manove (2011) also nd similar eects
of AFQT on the earnings of black and white males with at least a high school diploma but
nd that, unlike white dropouts, black dropouts are not rewarded for AFQT.
As we pointed out in our analysis of Altonji and Pierret, if employers have more diculty
observing or learning productivity of black workers, the coecients of p and pt should dier
across race. Joshua C. Pinkston (2006) carries out Altonji and Pierret's analysis separately
for black and white men to test this prediction. He shows that education has a greater impact
on wages for black men than for white men at the start of their working careers. As predicted,
as workers gain experience, the importance of education declines much more rapidly for black
41than for white men although the estimates are imprecise and the dierence is not statistically
signicant. Furthermore, the eect of AFQT scores on log wages increases with experience for
black men but does not change for white men, and this dierence is statistically signicant.
Thus Pinkston's results are consistent with lower initial observability of the productivity of
black men.
6.2.2 Static Models
Most of the literature follows Aigner and Cain in assuming that productivity (conditional on
other observables) is normally distributed with known mean and variance but that observed
productivity equals actual productivity plus normally distributed measurement error. Using
standard results in the statistical literature, this implies that expected productivity given
the signal is a weighted average of mean productivity and observed productivity. The greater
the variance of the measurement, the more weight that is placed on the mean and the less
on observed productivity.
While there are a number of routes whereby greater uncertainty about productivity can
aect wages, much of the focus in the literature has been on human capital investment.
Shelly J. Lundberg and Richard Startz (1983) show that members of groups subject to more
measurement error undertake less unobservable investment in their productivity. In essence,
because the investment, itself, is not observed and blacks get less benet from the productiv-
ity increase, they have less incentive to make such investments than do otherwise comparable
whites. Consequently, even if two groups are ex ante identical, the one with greater measure-
ment error will end up with lower mean productivity. Moreover, high productivity blacks
will be hurt the most.
However, there is a long literature going back to Arrow and Spence that argues that
if productivity is dicult to observe, productive workers will have an incentive to invest
in observable signals of their productivity. Lang and Manove (2011) have investigated the
case where investment is observable and show that the group with more measurement error
will over-invest more in the observable signal. They provide evidence that among blacks
and whites with similar AFQT scores and educational attainment at the time of taking
the AFQT, blacks go on to get more additional education. If blacks get more education
than whites of similar ability do, then at a given level of education, blacks will be less able
than whites are and will receive lower wages. However, conditional only on ability and not
education, blacks' higher educational attainment should raise their wages.
Therefore, to explain why blacks earn less conditional on ability and why the wage gap
42is larger when we also control for education requires a combination of the Lundberg/Startz
and Lang/Manove arguments. However, combining these two models is likely to run into
problems. When there are only observable investments, overinvestment tends to increase
with innate ability. This happens because the least able worker has no incentive to signal
his (low) ability while very able workers have to overinvest more to distinguish themselves
from the somewhat able. Moreover, to the extent that ability and unobservable investments
are complements, we would expect underinvestment of this form to be more severe among
the more able. Thus a hybrid model would tend to falsely predict that the black-white wage
gap should increase with education.29
One way to solve this problem is to assume that education aects the information struc-
ture. Arcidiacono, Bayer and Hizmo (2010) nd that the market knows all the information
included in AFQT when college graduates enter the labor market. Consistent with this
nding, Lang and Manove (2011) assume that  increases with education and that there is
no asymmetric information between the worker and employers at a suciently high level of
education. Based on this assumption, they predict that blacks and whites with high and low
levels of ability will have similar levels of education but that blacks with intermediate levels
of ability will get more education than do comparable whites. Using AFQT as a proxy for
ability they conrm this prediction.
They also predict that blacks and whites will have similar wages at high and low levels of
education. Allowing for unobserved investments would not change the prediction for those
with high levels of education since at high levels of education productivity is fully revealed
and thus investment is ecient. However, at low levels of education, blacks would do less
unobservable investing.
One major objection to statistical discrimination models is that the market learns worker
productivity much too quickly (Lange, 2005) for educational signaling and statistical discrim-
ination to be important in the long run. We have not developed a realistic calibration of
a model with both observed and unobserved investment and in which the market learns
productivity quickly. But it is straightforward to create large dierences in a simple and
unrealistic model.
To see this, suppose that workers can get either 0 units (uneducated) or 1 unit (edu-
cated) of education. A unit of education is completely unproductive. However, there is
an unobservable investment that is productive. Further assume that the market can ob-
29Our wording is deliberately cautious. There may be assumptions that do not produce this prediction.
We do not know what would happen, for example, if error terms were not normal, education were treated
as discrete or there were other departures from the standard model.
43serve perfectly the productivity of all whites and of educated blacks but cannot observe the
productivity of uneducated blacks at all and thus pays the same wage to all uneducated
blacks. It should be evident that all whites will be uneducated since there is no benet from
education and each will choose the optimal level of the unobserved investment since their
productivity is observed even though their investment is not. It is easy to choose parame-
ters in which all blacks choose to become educated. Conditional on being educated, blacks
also choose the optimal level of unobserved investment. However, because they invest in
education and therefore spend less time in the labor force, the optimal level of unobserved
investment is lower for blacks than it is for whites. Note also, that in equilibrium the market
learns productivity immediately; hence learning is indeed very fast.
Thus static models of screening discrimination can explain some key empirical regulari-
ties. Most notably, they show how black men earn less than apparently similar white men
but that this dierential disappears at high skill levels. Furthermore, these models explain
a rather surprising pattern of education dierences between apparently similar blacks and
whites. What we have not established is whether a more realistic model with modest dier-
ences in the market's ability to observe the productivity of blacks can generate empirically
relevant dierences in education and earnings.
6.2.3 Dynamic Models
We have already noted that the black-white wage gap has increased over time in the NLSY79.
In addition, there is considerable underrepresentation of blacks at the highest occupational
levels. David Bjerk (2008), for example, points out the very low representation of blacks
among baseball managers. It is unclear whether the trends in the NLSY79 represent ex-
perience or time eects, and, as discussed earlier, the labor market performance of highly
skilled blacks is similar to that of their white counterparts. Nevertheless, it is interesting
to explore the implications of screening discrimination for the evolution of job assignment
over the life-cycle. Although they are quite dierent in their formal models, the underlying
mechanisms in Bjerk and Altonji (2005) are similar, and we will focus on the former.
The essential assumptions behind both models are that 1) jobs are dierentially respon-
sive to skill so that it is benecial to match workers to the job appropriate to their skill
level, 2) higher level (more skill responsive) jobs are more informative about a worker's true
productivity, and 3) that rms can only commit to wage oers, not to particular job place-
ments. In Altonji, workers whom the market believes are more highly skilled are initially
placed in higher level jobs, are appropriately matched faster and therefore increase their
44earnings faster.
In Bjerk's model, there are two skill levels, high and low, and three job levels, low, career
and director. Low-skill workers are most productive at the lowest jobs and least productive
at the director jobs while the opposite is true for high-skill workers. This ensures that there
will be two critical levels of beliefs, p; about skill level such that the expected productivity
of those with p < p1 is highest in the low jobs, p1 < p < p2 is highest in career jobs, and
p > p2 is highest in director jobs. Since p (or the information needed to derive it) is common
knowledge, rms can commit only to a wage and not to a job assignment, and workers are
fully mobile, rms will always assign workers to the job in which they have the highest
expected productivity based on current information.
We can immediately see how in a model of this type initial information can aect future
earnings. In an extreme case (which Bjerk does not assume), low jobs would provide no
information. In this case, any worker who entered the labor market with p < p1 would
remain in a low job forever. Suppose that p < p1 for both blacks and whites but employers
cannot distinguish among new black entrants and therefore assign them all pb = p. In
contrast, the market recognizes two types of whites, those with pa < p and those with
p1 < pc < p2: It will assign all black workers (with pb) and all white workers with pa to low
jobs where they will remain forever, and all white workers with pc to career jobs. The greater
initial information about white workers will not only give them higher initial wages since
they are better matched initially, but the wage dierential will grow over time as information
about the whites initially assigned to career jobs accrues and they are increasingly better
matched. In this extreme example, only whites initially assigned to career jobs ever make it
to the top level.
Bjerk's model is less extreme because he allows the market to continue to learn about
worker productivity even when the worker is employed in a low job. Nevertheless, the
intuition remains the same. If either the mean p is lower for blacks than for whites or the
market acquires information about whites more rapidly, then it will take the best whites less
time to reach the top jobs than it takes equally skilled blacks. Equivalently, blacks will be
underrepresented in these jobs relative to their proportion among the highly skilled.
6.2.4 Concluding Remarks
The models discussed in this section focus almost exclusively on wages. In principle, statis-
tical discrimination could aect hiring and thus employment and unemployment. Thus, in
Cornell and Welch (1996), rms hire the best worker who applies, and because employers
45are less able to assess the productivities of blacks than they can the productivities of whites,
as long as there is some probability of having more than one white competitor for the job,
black applicants have less than a proportional chance of getting the job. However, they do
not embed this in a model of job search. Lang, Manove and Dickens (2005) note in passing
that greater uncertainty about the productivity of blacks can generate the preference for
white applicants assumed in their model but do not analyze the combined model formally.
Therefore, thus far, this literature has provided very little insight into racial dierences in
unemployment incidence and duration except that we have suggested that in a dynamic ver-
sion of the model, blacks might accept lower wages in order to be in jobs that better reveal
their productivity, which could, in turn, result in their being red more frequently.
However, the screening discrimination literature has recognized the importance of within-
group heterogeneity. Variants of the model can not only produce large wage dierentials but
explain important patterns such as the larger gap among relatively low-skill workers and
dierences in education between blacks and whites.
6.3 Rational Stereotyping
The second strand of statistical discrimination examines how employers' stereotypes about
the productivity of the members of a particular group dierentiates rms' hiring, job as-
signment, wage, and/or promotion decisions across worker groups even when the groups are
ex-ante equally productive. Building on Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973), Coate and Loury's
(1993) work on self-fullling stereotypes serves as the foundation for much of the recent work
in this strain of labor market discrimination models. Since the underpinning assumption of
these models is that employers hold negative beliefs about the quality of black workers, we
begin this section with a little survey and experimental evidence demonstrating the existence
and persistence of stereotypes. We then build upon Coate and Loury's basic framework to
introduce dynamic models of self-fullling beliefs with implications for promotion.
6.3.1 Negative Stereotypes and Their Persistence
There is considerable evidence that employers have negative perceptions of inner-city black
men.30 The 1988 Urban Poverty and Family Life Study's survey of 179 Chicago employers
revealed that many employers described inner-city black males as uneducated, irresponsible,
30See Harry Holzer (1996), Philip Moss and Chris Tilly (2001), Joleen Kirschenman and Kathryn Neck-
erman (1991), Monica Birenat and Diane Kobrynowicz (1997), Wilson (1996), and Devah Pager, Bruce
Western, and Bart Bonikowski (2008).
46unreliable, and dishonest (Wilson, 1996). Of the employers surveyed, 74 percent expressed
negative views of inner-city black men, asserting that inner-city black workers bring traits
that negatively inuence job performance. Interestingly, these negative views of urban black
men were not limited to white employers. Of the fteen employers surveyed who were African
American, twelve expressed views that were negative, suggesting that these perceptions are
not driven by employers seeking to justify their racial animosity. This conclusion is reinforced
by the fact that the majority of employers showed positive attitudes toward black women
(Wilson, 1996).
Moss and Tilly (2001) document similar perceptions of black workers from a multi-city
telephone survey of managers of roughly 8,000 rms in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los
Angeles between 1992 and 1995. Depending on the city, 15 to 33 percent of the employers
said that blacks lag in hard skills, interaction skills, or motivation.
It is not hard to understand how such stereotypes could have arisen. For much of U.S.
history, blacks faced strong obstacles to obtaining human capital in the form of de facto or
de juris school, housing and social segregation. And this segregation would also have limited
their ability to adopt white speech patterns and other aspects of social behavior. However,
while segregation and other obstacles have not disappeared, they have certainly diminished.
Wouldn't we expect blacks to have dramatically increased their investment in human capital
and other skills?
Rational stereotyping models explain that such stereotypes can be self-enforcing so that
because employers hold negative views of them, blacks are less likely than are whites to invest
in the requisite skills for good jobs, and because blacks are less likely to invest, employers'
negative views are justied.
Roland Fryer, Jacob Goeree, and Charles Holt (2001) demonstrate the persistence of
negative stereotypes in a classroom experiment in which workers have the choice of investing
to raise their productivities. Employers observe a test outcome (red or blue) with blue
being more likely if the worker invested. Purple workers draw their cost of investment from
a distribution with a higher mean for the rst 10 rounds of the experiment and from the
same distribution for the following 50 rounds. Having observed the worker color and the
test outcome, the employer must decide whether to hire that worker or not. The results
show that purple workers were less likely to invest and get hired and this rational negative
stereotyping on hiring and investment remained even after the investment cost distributions
were equalized. We turn now to models in which such stereotypes can persist.
476.3.2 Coate and Loury's Model of Self-Fullling Stereotypes
Coate and Loury (1993) demonstrate that even when whites and blacks are ex-ante equally
productive, employers' negative beliefs about black workers can be perpetuated by the work-
ers' investment decisions when that investment is dicult to observe. While Coate and
Loury is well-known, it is worth discussing here since it serves as the framework for more
recent models of self-perpetuating beliefs. This is a model of job assignment rather than
wage determination although wages can be incorporated into the main model without much
complication.31
There are many workers and rms. Workers belong to two identiable groups: black
and white. The workers also are dierentiated by their cost of investment c; which in the
original paper is exogenously drawn from U[0;1]. After observing his cost of investment, the
worker makes a dichotomous investment decision before entering the labor market, choosing
to invest (\qualied") or not to invest (\unqualied").
Firms can observe the worker's group membership, but not whether the worker has
invested. Instead, they observe a noisy signal  which depends on the worker's investment
decision. The cdfs of the signals for qualied and unqualied workers are given by Fq() 
Fu() so that higher values of the signal are more likely if the worker is qualied. Having
observed the worker's group and his signal , the rm's only decision is whether to assign
him to one of two tasks: easy (E) or hard (H).
Productivities are such that it is optimal to assign unqualied workers to the easy task
and qualied workers to the hard task. If there is uncertainty about whether a worker is
qualied, then there is a critical probability that the worker is qualied, above which he
should be assigned to the hard task and below which to the easy task. Workers receive a
wage of w if they are assigned to the hard task. The wage and the rm's net return from
assigning workers to the easy task are normalized to zero. In the example below, we will
endogenize the wages since we believe this adds further insights.
Firms have a prior belief  2 [0;1] that a worker is qualied. This belief may depend
on group membership. Based on the signal ; rms update their initial beliefs. Hence, for a
given , there will be a critical value of the signal such that the worker will be assigned to
the hard task if and only  exceeds this value. We write this as
s = s
(): (31)
31For example, see the numerical example presented in Lang (2007) pages 277-280.
48s is decreasing in , meaning that the better the prior belief, the lower the required signal
for assignment to the hard task.
Given this signal standard, workers must decide whether the expected benet of invest-
ment is greater than his cost or
w[Fq(s)   Fu(s)] > c: (32)
If c  U[0;1], a fraction  = w[Fq(s)   Fu(s)] will become qualied given s. Given the
assumptions about the distribution of , the fraction of qualied workers is initially increasing
then decreasing in s.32
In equilibrium, the rm's prior beliefs about the fraction of qualied workers are conrmed
by the investment decisions of the workers. Therefore, we can dene the equilibrium pair of




for g 2 fw;bg.
A discriminatory equilibrium can occur whenever (33) has multiple solutions. Then em-
ployers can believe that blacks are less likely to have invested (i.e. w > b), and knowing
that employers hold such a negative stereotype, workers conrm the employers' beliefs by
their investment decisions. Even though both blacks and whites have the same skill and
investment cost distribution, rms prior beliefs actually produce groups of dierent produc-
tivity.33
32This is easiest to see if there is no signal that is observed only if the worker is qualied or only if the
worker is unqualied, that is any signal can be produced by either a qualied or unqualied worker. In this
case, whenever  is 0 or 1, no worker invests since the posterior belief will always still be 0 if  is 0 and 1 if
 is 1. For other values of ; there will be a positive return to investing and workers with a suciently low
cost of investing will do so.
33Andrea Moro (2009) and Moro and Peter Norman (2004) have criticized the linearity of the production
technology in Coate and Loury which implies that the expected marginal productivities of workers depend
only on their own signal and the aggregate investment of their own group. Moro argues that in this en-
vironment, statistical discrimination only arises as a result of a type of coordination failure in which the
minority group fails to coordinate on a \good" equilibrium. The dominant group has nothing to lose if the
disadvantaged group could solve the coordination failure. Moro and Norman consider a production function
that exhibits complementarity between the two tasks. Hence, the expected marginal product in the high-skill
job of a given worker depends negatively on aggregate investment in human capital from members of the
other group, because when more members of the other group acquire human capital, the higher aggregate
availability of skills decreases the marginal product of a skilled worker. Therefore, the incentive to acquire
skills decreases when more members of the other group acquire skills. The complementarity generates in-
centives for groups to specialize and asymmetric equilibria may exist even if there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium.
49Table 1: Rational Stereotypes with Endogenous Wages: Example
Signal Distribution Posterior P(qualied) Task Assignment
Unqualied Qualied High Prior Low Prior High Prior Low Prior
L .7 .1 .16 .10 E E
M .2 .4 .72 .61 H E
H .1 .5 .87 .79 H H
To better clarify the workings of the Coate/Loury model, we present a simpler example.
Workers emit three signals L, M and H with probabilities given in table 1. There are three
costs of investing. Approximately 43.7% of workers are low cost and the same proportion are
high cost while the remainder are medium cost. If rms believe that both low and medium
cost workers get qualied, their posterior beliefs given the signal are given in the column
labeled \high prior." If they believe only low cost individuals invest, their posterior belief is
given by the column labeled \low prior."
Suppose now that the productivities of qualied and unqualied workers in the easy and
hard jobs is such that it is optimal to assign a worker to the hard job if the probability he is
qualied is at least two-thirds. Then, with the high prior, rms will assign all those workers
with a signal of M or H to the hard task, but with the low prior will require a signal of H.
Note that with a high prior, investing raises a worker's probability of being place in the
hard task from :3 to :9 or 60 percentage points, while with the low prior the gures are :1 and
:5 or 40 percentage points: With exogenous wages, wE and wH; we will have two equilibria
if the costs of investing satisfy
cl < :4(wH   wE) < cm
< :6(wH   wE) < ch:
(34)
In this case, low-cost workers always and high-cost workers never invest but those in the
middle invest in the high-prior but not the low-prior equilibrium.34
We have cooked the numbers to make it easy to endogenize the wage. The fraction
of workers assigned to the hard task who are actually qualied is .795 with either prior.
Therefore, if the wage cannot be conditioned on the signal, wH is independent of the equi-
librium. If all workers are equally productive in the easy task, wE is also independent of
the equilibrium. Condition (34) applies, and one must simply choose cm and productivities
for unqualied and qualied workers in each job to ensure that it holds. Of course, in the
34We ignore the equilibrium in which rms believe that no one invests and in which their is no investment.
50high-prior equilibrium rms should be willing to pay more to workers with an H signal than
to those with an M signal. In this case (34) rms would no longer apply, but choosing
parameters to ensure the existence of two equilibria remains straightforward.
The model predicts that blacks should earn less than whites do both unconditionally and
conditional on the signal. It further predicts that the wage dierential should be highest
at an intermediate level of the investment cost distribution where blacks are not only paid
less conditional on their signal but also invest less. Finally, it makes no prediction regarding
wages conditional on job assignment.
Therefore, one concern about the static rational stereotype model is the relation between
its predictions about wages and the empirical regularities. The model does explain why
blacks earn less than observationally equivalent whites if the \equivalent factors" are not
proxies for the cost of investment or the signal. If, for example, we interpret AFQT as a
proxy for investment costs, the model does not predict the convergence on earnings at high,
and possibly low, AFQT. On the other hand, we might choose to interpret AFQT as a proxy
for the unobserved investment, in which case the model predicts counterfactually that the
eect of AFQT on wages would be smaller for blacks than for whites.
Perhaps the most important contribution of Coate and Loury is its discussion of arma-
tive action which they dene as a policy that requires workers from each group to be assigned
to the hard task in proportion to their representation in the overall worker population. They
show that under some conditions, a \patronizing equilibrium" exists. In this equilibrium,
rms' negative stereotypes worsen as a result of armative action. Because rms believe
that black workers are less qualied on average, they set a lower standard for blacks to meet
the armative action requirement. Under certain parameters, this further reduces the in-
vestment incentives of the black workers, and they will be even less qualied than before the
anti-discriminatory policy was in place. A patronizing equilibrium is most likely to occur
when blacks make-up a small proportion of the population, because the expected cost of
lowering the standard for blacks is smaller than raising the standard for whites to achieve
parity.
Before moving on to dynamic versions of the model, we make a few closing remarks that
apply generally to the static and dynamic models.
1. We note that the general message of the Coate/Loury model is that investment by
each member of a group provides positive externalities to all group members. It is
not obvious that this is true when the groups are dierent ex ante. It is relatively
easy to construct examples in which if more blacks have a high cost of investing, some
51blacks who would not invest if they were white will invest in the hope of distinguishing
themselves from the mass of noninvestors.35 This is important because the underlying
assumption in the rational stereotyping literature is that there would be no dierences
between blacks and whites in the absence of employers' stereotypes. Once premarket
factors, including premarket discrimination, aect the skills workers bring to the labor
market, it is no longer self-evident that negative stereotypes are harmful. Instead the
model is consistent with the view that \if you're black, you have to work twice as hard
to get ahead" is motivating rather than demotivating.
2. As we discussed in the case of screening discrimination, the assumption that all invest-
ment is unobserved may be critical. It seems likely that blacks would have a greater
incentive than whites to signal that their cost of investment is low. Whether allowing
an additional signal would eliminate multiple equilibria or otherwise substantially alter
the model has not been explored.
3. Because group membership is so important for the model, it is problematic that how
groups are dened is arbitrary and changes over time. Many of the stereotypes dis-
cussed earlier in this section applied to inner-city black men. Can individuals remove
themselves from this group by moving from the inner city or by changing dress or
speech style? More broadly, the denition of white has changed over time to include
southern Europeans who were not clearly \white" a century ago.
6.3.3 Models with Promotion
This negative summary is somewhat mitigated by the existence of models of promotion. If
the initial hiring equilibrium is discriminatory, rms believe that black workers are less likely
to have invested and will set a set a higher signal standard for black workers to be assigned
35Suppose 80% of white workers have a very low cost of investing and 20% have a cost of 4. In contrast,
80% of blacks have a very high costs of investing and 20% have a cost of 4. Further assume that qualied
workers give o a high signal half the time and a low signal half the time while unqualied workers give o
the high signal only 10 percent of the time and the low signal 90 percent of the time. Finally assume that
workers in the easy task produce 0, qualied workers in the hard task produce 10 and unqualied workers
in the hard task produce -2. For whites, the unique interior solution is that workers with the low cost invest
and those with a cost of 4 do not. All workers are assigned to the hard task but those with the high signal
earn about 3.1 more than those with the low signal. For blacks the unique interior solution is that those
with a cost of 4 invest while the high cost types do not. Those with an L signal are assigned to the easy task
and earn 0. Those with an H signal are assigned to the hard task and earn about 4.7. Note that because
a higher proportion of blacks than of whites with the high signal are unqualied, blacks are worse o both
conditional on their signal and conditional on being assigned to the high task, but the externality increases
their incentive to invest.
52to the harder task. Because the blacks who invest are drawn from a lower part of the cost
distribution, among those placed in the hard task, the distribution of costs can be lower for
blacks than for whites. In the example in Table 1 above, almost 80% of blacks promoted
have a low-cost of investing compared with less than half of the whites.36 This suggests that
employers might believe that blacks assigned to the hard task are more likely than are whites
to continue to invest in themselves after being assigned to the hard task and therefore be
more likely to receive subsequent promotion.
Fryer (2007) shows that such belief-ipping equilibria can exist if there are very strict
hiring standards at the hiring and liberal promotion standards. If rms do not gain much
from promoting a qualied worker (instead of leaving him in the lower level job), then they
are less likely to take risks in the promotion stage and may adopt a very strict standard
for both blacks and whites. However, if the gains from promotion are too large, then rms
are likely to be very liberal in their promotion standards for both worker groups. Only for
intermediate values of prot margins can we have strict hiring standard for blacks and liberal
hiring standards for promoting blacks in equilibrium.37 Thus Fryer's model has potentially
testable empirical content, but we are unaware of any attempts to test it.
In Fryer, blacks are over-represented in the easy job but can, under some conditions, also
be over-represented in the highest jobs. Jee-Yeon K. Lehmann (2011) examines law rms
and nds a very dierent situation. Conditional on measured characteristics, most notably
law school quality and grades, blacks are more likely to be hired into the most prestigious
entry-level jobs but are less likely to be promoted. However, conditional on being assigned
tasks, such as meeting with clients and planning strategy, that further promotion, black and
white associates are equally likely to be promoted to partner.
She shows that this can be the direct outcome of an anti-discrimination or armative
action policy in which the managing partner or some other central group controls initial hir-
ing, but task assignment is decentralized to the partners working with individual associates.
The central hiring committee may want more black associates or may be willing to \take
a chance" in order to have more black partners, but individual partners put less weight on
the collective goal. Knowing the hiring committee's behavior, individual partners require a
higher signal in order to be willing to assign black associates to the more challenging tasks.38
36Note that because investment decisions in the rst stage would take account of the possibility of future
promotion, to maintain the one-period equilibrium as the equilibrium of the two-period game, we would have
to adjust some of the parameters, but that is straightforward.
37Like Coate and Loury, Fryer does not endogenize wages, but it seems unlikely that this would greatly
aect the results.
38While the main conclusions of the model are not limited to the market for lawyers, Lehmann motivates
536.3.4 Concluding Remarks
The strength and weakness of the rational stereotype models is that they can explain the
persistence of discrimination between groups with no underlying dierences. Thus, one does
not need to rely on strong or weak prejudice or dicult to verify dierences in the ability of
the market to evaluate workers. But it is not clear that the mechanisms underlying the ra-
tional stereotype model are operative when there are real underlying dierences between the
groups. Indeed the eect of these real dierences on rms' inferences and workers' incentives
seems to us to be one of the largely unexplored areas in the theory of race discrimination.
As we have noted, it seems to us that if, for example, a higher proportion of blacks than of
whites has a high cost of investing, blacks could either have less incentive to invest because
they cannot shift employers' beliefs that they are unskilled or more incentive because there
is more value in distinguishing themselves from the large mass of unskilled workers.
We have also noted the limited empirical content of the rational stereotype model. It is
suciently exible to support higher or lower promotion rates for blacks, and it is unclear
for what one should control to test any predictions about wages. This is reected in the
near absence of tests of the model and most of the few tests that have been conducted are
based on experiments that do not allow interdependencies between and among worker and
rm actions that are required for the existence of multiple equilibria.39
7 A Note on Audit Studies
There is an extensive set of \audit" studies examining race discrimination in various settings.
While it might have been natural to discuss these in the context of the empirical regularities,
it is helpful to review them in the context of the theories.
In the employment context, the audits involve applications by similar blacks and whites
for identical or similar jobs. Resumes are typically randomized so that they are orthogonal to
race, and when in-person applications are used, the white and black applicants are trained
to act similarly. Such studies almost universally nd worse outcomes for blacks than for
whites. Marc Bendick (2007) reviews ten audit studies of employment discrimination on the
her model with evidence from the legal eld in which rms typically act institutionally in hiring but leave
work assignments to individual partners.
39One purported test is really a test of a two-armed bandit theory. Do subjects recognize that the
probabilities for the \other arm" have improved. Since the probabilities simultaneously deteriorate on the
\current arm," it is not surprising that they experiment and learn about the change. Another essentially
asks whether subjects invest more when the incentive to invest is higher.
54basis of race. All nd better outcomes for whites than for blacks although the dierences
are not always statistically signicant at conventional levels. One important point that is
sometimes missed is that even if such studies reveal discriminatory behavior, they do not
tell us whether it is motivated by prejudice or by statistical discrimination. Therefore, they
are generally not helpful for distinguishing among the theories discussed in this paper.40
Using human beings to audit employers inevitably raises the concern that the auditors'
behavior or appearance (other than race) diered in ways that biased the study. Economists,
at least, appear to prefer studies in which this element is removed. Two studies (Bertrand
and Mullainathan, 2004; LeeAnn Lodder, Scott McFarland and Diana White, 2003) rely
on written applications and resumes with names that signal race without explicitly stating
it. In addition, Marc Bendick, Charles Jackson, and Victor Reinoso (1994) cite a study
that uses involvement in organizations (e.g. the NAACP) to signal race. Bertrand and
Mullainathan assigned each resume a common white name (such as Emily and Greg) or
a distinctively African-American-sounding name (such as Lakisha and Jamal). They sent
ctitious resumes in response to newspaper help-wanted ads in Chicago and Boston and
measured the call back rates for interviews. Overall, 9.7% of the \applicants" submitting
resumes with white-sounding names were called back for an interview compared to only 6.5%
of the applicants with black-sounding names. Furthermore, African-Americans experienced
a signicantly smaller increase in the callback rates for improvement in their credentials.41
Lodder, McFarland and White (2003) obtained similar results. Apparently black applicants
received calls for interviews 26% of the times compared with 31% for white applicants.
However, unlike the former study, the latter did not nd that resume quality benets whites
more than it does blacks.
In contrast, Fryer and Stephen Levitt (2004) look directly at the eect of having a dis-
tinctively black name on adult outcomes of blacks. They nd worse outcomes for those with
black names but note that black names are also associated with lower maternal education
and income. When they control for mother's socioeconomic status, Fryer and Levitt nd
that the relation between adult outcomes and names is socially inconsequential.
40In their discussion of their results, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) also note that both statistical
and taste-based models of discrimination could be formulated to t the results from their audit study. For
example, the nding that employers located in more African American neighborhoods are less discriminating
is consistent with both models based on employer/customer prejudice in a neoclassical or search framework.
41There are a number of concerns about audit studies in general and the use of names, in particular. In
particular, names may signal more than just race. However, since our focus here is on the relation between
theory and the audit studies, we have not undertaken a full review of the approach. For further discussion,
see Heckman (1998) and Lang (2007, pp 294-7).
55There are at least three reactions to this body of research. The rst is that it shows that
names in the audit study were merely signaling social class. We think this is incorrect. If
employers are less likely to interview applicants with black names because they are signaling
social class, then even high social-class blacks with black-sounding names (and those who are
more likely to be higher ability and more likely to get an interview) should also be less likely
to get an interview. Then, even controlling for social class, this would mean that individuals
with distinctively black names should face worse outcomes.
The second reaction is that it proves that discrimination by some employers has no
harmful eects. Even if 15 to 30 percent of employers discriminate, 70 to 85 do not, and
this is sucient to ensure that there is no discrimination at the level of the market. Either
information about which employers discriminate is suciently widespread that blacks do
not apply to them, or the job search process is suciently fast and low cost that a modest
reduction in the arrival rate of oers is inconsequential. According to this perspective, this
group of studies proves the validity of the Becker model.
Finally, if an important minority of employers discriminates against blacks, then having
a black-sounding name could be harmful or benecial. Individuals with black names would
get fewer interviews but if the discriminating employers would never hire blacks anyway, this
is a benet since the interview time can be used more productively. On the other hand, if the
discriminating employers are not innitely prejudiced, some fraction of the time, they will
decide that the black interviewee is the best candidate and not being called for an interview
will be costly. It is not clear a priori which eect should dominate. According to this view,
the audit study shows that there is discrimination against individuals with black-sounding
names, and the Fryer-Levitt study shows that the reason they suer discrimination is because
they are black, not some other reason.
We do not attempt to choose between the last two views. Our point is that the choice of
theory is very important for interpreting the studies. If we analyze them in the light of the
Becker model, they suggest that the fraction of discriminating employers is suciently small
that the market has, in most contexts, eliminated discrimination. If we analyze them using a
perspective based on Black or Lang, Manove and Dickens, this degree of discrimination can
produce quite notable wage dierentials. As we have already discussed, if 30% of rms will
not hire a black, then, using Black's model, we can get close to the unemployment duration
dierential and easily explain the existing wage dierentials. As already discussed, LMD
cannot t the unemployment duration data. However, it can easily produce a 10% wage
dierential with only a very modest proportion of discriminating rms.
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Readers will, of course, have their own preferences for models of unemployment. Some may
nd lower wages as sucient to explain unemployment among blacks since lower wages will
make blacks more likely to choose leisure or home production over market work. We nd
it hard to believe that blacks are more likely to enter unemployment and to remain there
longer than apparently comparable whites because they nd it optimal to take longer and
more frequent vacations although we recognize that others disagree.
Therefore, the higher incidence of unemployment among blacks suggests to us that we
require a model in which blacks are more likely to take jobs for which they turn out to
be poorly suited. We have already suggested that Rosen's model could be reformulated so
that workers receive a signal of the probability that they are well matched for a job. In her
equilibrium, they would set a lower reservation probability and therefore be more likely to
discover that the match is not good. It is also possible that, for many of the same reasons
used to justify the assumption that rms are less able to evaluate black applicants, blacks
are less able to judge how well they are matched to individual jobs. This would both justify
a preference on the part of rms for hiring whites and explain why blacks are more likely
to exit employment for unemployment. Similarly, if rms have greater diculty evaluating
black applicants, it is plausible that they will prefer to hire whites and when they hire blacks
will be more likely to have \made a mistake" although we suspect that this will depend on
the details of the model.
The longer unemployment durations among blacks suggest to us that search must be an
element of any model of discrimination. But we have argued that the model must generate the
dierences from modest levels of discrimination. We have seen that models in which longer
unemployment durations are driven by the presence of rms with strong discriminatory
tastes require an implausibly high proportion of discriminatory rms to generate empirically
relevant duration dierences. Therefore, we are inclined towards search models in which
rms choose the \best" applicant and in which blacks and whites apply for the same jobs
at least some of the time. We have noted that, as in the case of Lang, Manove and Dickens
(2005), simply having rms hire whites in preference to blacks need not generate longer
unemployment durations for blacks if blacks avoid applying to jobs to which whites apply.
There are a variety of mechanisms that will generate direct competition between blacks and
whites. The simplest is random search since there is no opportunity for avoiding direct
competition. However, directed search models can also produce such competition if there
is sucient worker and/or rm heterogeneity of the right type such as dierences in risk
57aversion or discount rates among workers.
Within a random search model, poorer assessment of the job match by either rm or
worker should produce a wage dierential. Given that Rosen's model can produce an empir-
ically plausible wage dierential, we expect that a revised version of the model would as well.
Directed search can only simultaneously match the unemployment and wage dierentials if
there is some, but not complete, overlap in where whites and blacks apply.
We have already seen that dierences in the observability of the productivity of black
and white workers can generate wage dierentials in models without search. Adding search
might increase the dierentials in some models. Moreover, if information improves with skill,
we can explain the convergence in labor market outcomes of high-skill whites and blacks.
8.1 Implications for Policy
Since we have concluded that none of the existing models of race discrimination in the
labor market explains the major empirical regularities, it should not be surprising that we
are reluctant to draw strong policy conclusions from the existing literature. Nevertheless,
policy-makers will not wait for economists to solve the puzzle of labor market discrimination
before acting, and we do believe that the current literature provides at least some guidance.
First, much of the dierence in labor market outcomes between blacks and whites un-
doubtedly reects the skills workers bring to the labor market. The models we have discussed,
especially those with dynamic elements, show how premarket investment decisions may be
aected by expectations about how workers will be treated in the labor market. Therefore,
labor-market oriented policies can aect these investments.
Still, it would be foolish to ignore policies that directly aect premarket factors. Address-
ing such factors as neighborhood and school segregation (Edward Glaeser and David Cutler,
1997; William J. Collins and Robert A. Margo, 2000; David Card and Jesse Rothstein, 2007)
appears to be important, possibly because segregation perpetuates dierences in networks,
speech patterns, and modes of interactions that underlie models of screening discrimination.
To the extent that segregation and/or other factors create information problems emphasized
by models of statistical discrimination, it is intuitive to look to policies that can reduce these
information disparities.
Generally, since employers appear to have fairly good information about college gradu-
ates, the focus of such eorts should be on those entering the labor market directly after high
school graduation or after dropping out. For example, building relations between the labor
market and guidance counselors in schools with large minority populations might reduce
58labor market discrimination. More generally, providing potential employers with timely and
accurate information about high school performance would create incentives for students
to invest in themselves. It is striking that Massachusetts, which has put considerable re-
sources into developing high school exit exams that are generally viewed as among the best
in the country, does not allow performance indicators from these exams to be placed on
student transcripts. Instead, they can only be used to permit or deny graduation, thereby
preventing high school dropouts from establishing their strong performance on statewide
exams and students who would otherwise have graduated from high school from having their
accomplishments conrmed by a recognized form of certication.
On the employer side, information may be improved by armative action policies that
require more outreach and more thorough evaluation of candidates. Holzer and David Neu-
mark (2000) survey employers to assess how armative action inuenced their recruiting
and hiring practices. Firms engaging in armative action tended to recruit and screen more
extensively, casting a wider net across all worker groups, a nding conrmed by Alexandra
Kalev, Frank Dobbin, and Erin Kelly (2006). These rms also had more formally dened,
careful evaluation practices for their job applicants and employees that paid less attention
to traditionally stigmatized worker characteristics (e.g. welfare recipiency).42
Furthermore, consistent with the models that we have discussed, they nd that rms
using armative action had a greater proportion of minorities in their workforce, showed
greater willingness to hire minorities, and received more minority job applications. Screening
discrimination should be less important in rms that acquire more information, particularly
about African-American candidates. To the extent that potential applicants are aware that
mechanisms are in place to improve the quality of evaluation and to reduce any eects of
weak prejudice, minorities should be more likely to apply to such rms. Both factors will
increase the actual hiring rate and increase the productivity of the workers who are actually
hired.43 Holzer and Neumark nd that the performance ratings of blacks who are hired are
higher in rms using armative action, but they do not nd eects on whites, and they nd
adverse eects on Hispanic men.
42They were also more likely to provide training after hiring. This could reect the greater benet of
careful screening when the rm intends to invest more in its workers or the greater return to investing in
workers who have been carefully screened. Such practices appear to be complements, and it is not obvious
that one causes the other.
43W. Bentley MacLeod (2003) extends the standard principal-agent model to incorporate the impact of
subjective evaluations. He shows that prejudiced evaluation of an individual can lead to lower pay and
performance. Hence, the adoption of a more formal evaluation process which reduces the subjective nature
of performance evaluations may provide a greater incentive for workers to be more productive on the job.
59However, it is important to note that there are costs to programs that create formal
evaluation procedures and increase the time and eort to objectively evaluating candidates.
Therefore, even if these policies can increase the productivity of their hires, rms will not
necessarily adopt them voluntarily. Thus, there is a potential role for policy to increase the
adoption of such programs.
A more controversial policy would encourage rms to diversify their hiring sta. Michael
A. Stoll, Stephen Raphael, and Holzer (2004) show that at establishments with a black
hiring ocer, the proportion of black applicants is 27 percentage points higher than in
establishments with a non-black hiring ocer. Furthermore, they nd that when the hiring
ocer is black, the probability that a black applicant is hired is about 20 percent higher.
These dierences decrease when they control for observable dierences across establishment
but remain signicant at conventional levels. In a more recent study, Laura Giuliano, David
I. Levine, and Jonathan Leonard (2009) use personnel data from a large U.S. retail rm and
also nd that non-black managers hire more whites and fewer blacks than black managers
do. It is dicult to establish conclusively that these dierences are causal, and if so, whether
they reect white hiring ocers' prejudice or information/language problems. However, they
suggest that the identity of the hiring ocer is consequential.
The most controversial policy would set dierent hiring standards for blacks and whites,
possibly through the use of quotas. The theoretical justication for this form of armative
action is weak. As discussed earlier, even when blacks and whites are ex ante identical,
armative action of this form can worsen rather than eliminate stereotypes. When factors
outside the labor market create ex ante dierences, setting dierent hiring standards can
again increase or decrease the incentive for black workers to invest in themselves.
8.2 Concluding Remarks
Despite our nding that no single existing theory can account for the broad empirical regu-
larities we discussed in section 3, we remain hopeful in light of the signicant progress that
has been made in models of discrimination over the last decade or two. The groundwork
appears to have been laid for a synthesis of theories that can explain key dierentials in the
black-white labor market outcomes in the U.S. more completely. Exploration of such models
can trigger further empirical investigations and better inform and guide policies towards
reducing racial inequalities in the labor market.
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